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Abstract 
 
Around US$ 200 billion was invested in liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects of Australia 
(period 2005-2013). By 2017 Australia is expected to have export capacity around 88 million 
metric tonne per annum (mmtpa), thus surpassing Qatar and becoming the largest supplier in 
Asia pacific region. This LNG boom attracted investors to Australia and spurred competition for 
resources. 
High demand and competition in the Asia Pacific region is showing importance for Australian 
projects to be on-time and on-budget in order to be competitive. But Australian LNG projects are 
experiencing cost overruns and delays. The costs of the projects exceed budget by between 12 
and 40%. The project investors and operators are major oil and gas companies.  
This thesis examines three Australian LNG projects under construction: Browse, Gorgon and 
Wheatstone. In order to explore the possible reasons for issues faced by projects they will be 
compared with three existing LNG facilities in Australia: Pluto and North West Shelf Venture.  
 
This thesis examines possible reasons for the delays and cost overruns faced by Australian LNG 
projects. The Royal Dutch Shell scenario planning principles as applied by Adam Kahane (2012) 
and KPMG (2011) are assessed as a management tool for project planning.  In order to identify 
factors influencing the planning process a discussion on findings made by various researchers is 
included: Pinto (2013), Parker Gates (2010) and Zakhary Wong (2007). They tried to identify 
common reasons that cause cost overruns and delays in projects and made certain suggestions to 
minimize issues.  
The analysis of selected projects showed that the future is inherently uncertain and even the 
largest and most experienced companies can run into trouble. Internal and external factors 
influence projects at the planning, decision making and implementation stages. Global 
competition and high concentration of LNG projects in one area of Australia made existing 
challenges more critical. This spurred competition and might be a reason for high LNG prices in 
the future. 
Though it is not possible to predict exact cost and start dates of projects, especially in the long-
term, a scenario planning approach can help minimize cost overruns and delays by making 
strategic planning more flexible and transparent. That helps ready companies for different 
outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis 
 
Many projects experience cost overruns and delays. Despite involvement of experienced 
companies project planning is always a challenge. Companies invest and managers commit to 
their projects, leaving unanswered question of “how to better plan for the future?” and “which 
factors are the most critical for project success?”  The future is uncertain and planning for future 
faces obstacles and limitations. Econometric forecasts help estimate cost of projects, but cannot 
measure effect of all factors influencing final cost of the projects.  They take into consideration 
factors of today and cannot estimate how much the environment might change in the future and 
what new factors might come into play. Studies conducted on project issues by Pinto (2013) and 
Parker Gates (2010) showed that projects rarely meet their initial costs and deadlines. Therefore 
it is important to consider different approaches for planning for future.  
 
 
1.2 Importance of using right approach for future planning 
 
Managers have different approaches to project planning. It is important to start planning process 
correctly by choosing right approaches and tools. Strategic management offers various methods 
in order to plan for future. They help to measure internal and external environment, make certain 
calculations, and identify critical success factors. The benchmarking method helps to study from 
the real life case using lessons learned from existing project. But relying on previous experience 
can be dangerous because it might create “anchoring effect” and prevent of seeing new 
challenges (Pinto, 2013). Previous experience is based on the past, but circumstances change 
over time. In order to plan for future it is better to be flexible and prepared for different 
outcomes. Is it possible to foresee all potential outcomes and how can we consider all possible 
factors that might have influence on project outcome? Kees van der Hejden from Royal Dutch 
Shell said that “Whenever life becomes more hectic and uncertain, scenario planning becomes 
more popular” (Kahane, 2012). Scenario planning principles offer to consider several options 
and create possible scenarios for future. It is important to understand that scenario planning 
principles give alternative options in order to minimize future uncertainties but not “predict the 
future” (Kahane, 2012).   
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That is why in my work I describe how scenario planning principles can be used as a 
management tool making strategic planning as a continuous cyclical process (Parker Gates, 
2010). This approach does not forecast fixed cost and deadline, but helps to be prepared for 
future uncertainty with minimum harm. 
  
1.3 Relevance of the research 
 
Project management is a complex process which depends on project participants, external 
environment, politics, country peculiarities, resource availability and human factor. When 
projects face issues of cost overruns and delays it is important to evaluate planning process and 
factors influencing it. Different factors have influence on the planning, decision making and 
project implementation stages. Some of those factors are known whereas the others are show up 
later. Thinking strategically and committing to the project is important (Parker Gates, 2010). But 
why cost overruns and delays still occur? When strategic planning is perceived as a non-static 
process it becomes easier to identify problems and make necessary changes at the early stages 
(Parker Gates, 2010). An open and open-ended discussion of challenges and possibilities can 
also help to evaluate hidden factors influencing the project. It also creates mutual trust and 
transparency as a basis for cooperation.  
 
1.4 Problem statement and research questions 
 
 
The problem statement of thesis is “What kind of forecasting method is used for 
investment decisions like those in large-scale Australian LNG projects?” 
A)  Econometric market projections? 
B) Qualitative scenario building among management according to the approach 
pioneered by the oil company Shell in the 1970s? 
Empirical sub-questions:  
1) How have company management in fact made investment decisions for the 
Australian LNG projects? 
2) What are the possible reasons for the delays and cost-overruns? Would it have 
been possible to avoid those mistakes or was it just a “bad luck”? 
 
 
 
3 
 
1.5 Reason for carrying out research on Australian LNG projects 
 
Australia is a resource-rich country and has great potential for LNG (Lee, 2013). Many oil major 
companies have invested in Australian LNG projects. This country is expected to be the leading 
exporter to the Asia Pacific region (Lee, 2013). According to APPEA
1
 (2013) the government of 
Australia is interested in supporting these projects as a country’s priority. “It is estimated that it 
is approximately US$ 207,658 billion ($200 billion Australian dollars as of 01.01.2013) have 
already been invested in these projects” (APPEA, 2013, p. 1). Despite investments involving 
many actors including international and local companies these projects are experiencing 
problems. The main problems occur as cost overruns, delays in schedule and some CSR 
problems. As it is seen from the “Policy Priorities” for 2013 the government is fully aware of 
reasons causing these problems and even has plans for solving them (APPEA, 2013). Project 
participants are mainly “three leading” companies such as Shell, Chevron and ExxonMobil with 
required experience and technological solutions (Chevron, 2009, p. 1). 
 
“The market for Australian LNG is Asia Pacific region with Japan relying on natural gas after 
Fukushima disaster and emerging economies such as China and India” (Ellis, et al., 2013, pp. 7-
9)  . At the same time Australia is not the only country exporting to Asia Pacific region. There 
are many rivals and country has internal obstacles to work on. The question arises why these 
projects are experiencing such problems putting at risk the whole country and stakeholders from 
the supply side and questioning energy security for Asia Pacific region.  
 
 
1.6 Plans for answering research questions 
 
For my thesis I used qualitative analysis and secondary data from official sources of information. 
The data mainly consists of project reports, publications, articles written by independent 
observers (not involved in the LNG projects) and reports made by relevant organizations such as 
EIA, IEA, APPEA. As for the theoretical part I have used the Royal Dutch Shell scenario 
planning principles together with findings of Jeffrey Pinto (2013) about critical and common 
managerial mistakes that cause unexpected costs and delays and described how they work within 
different organizations and situations. I also mention the work of Adam Kahane (2012) applying 
scenario planning to various projects and “KPMG solutions” for this method. I tried to look 
                                                          
1
 Australian petroleum production & exploration association 
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further and described the possible reasons that influence project outcome by using methods 
offered by Zakhary Wong (2007) who emphasized human factor in project management, and 
some critical success factors approach offered by Linda Parker Gates. 
 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
In order to write the thesis and open up a stated problem I used the structure consisting of six 
parts. First part describes what the paper is about and the reason for choosing the topic. Second 
part describes the methods and approaches used for planning in uncertain environment from 
different perspectives based on real life experience. Third part describes research methods used 
to write thesis. Fourth part consists of empirical findings. Fifth part consists of analysis and 
discussion. Sixth part is made of conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Uncertainties in the project planning caused by “Deadly sins” 
 
Project planning is always difficult task and requires accurate estimates. There are many 
expectations from projects and even more unanswered questions. Jeffrey Pinto (2013, p. 644) 
from Indiana university tried to answer his own question: “why is it that interest in project 
management is at an all-time high, professional project managers are being developed within 
numerous corporations, and project management training and educational opportunities abound, 
yet numerous projects themselves are still consistently failing to deliver promised value?”. Pinto 
(2013, p. 644) identified seven “deadly sins” that project managers often do and which cause 
problems for the projects down the road. Most of them are linked the human factor: “errors of 
optimism bias, artificial plan manipulation, poor change control, and inadequate risk 
management” (Pinto, 2013, pp. 645-649). These seven deadly sins will be called mistakes in the 
rest of the text. 
 
As a first “deadly mistake” Pinto (2013, p. 645) defines “optimism bias” as “individual’s or 
organization’s belief that they are less at risk than anyone else for experiencing a negative 
consequence” (cited in Shepperd, et. al, 2002).  Pinto (2013, p. 645) lists many factors causing 
this problem such as: “their desired end state, their cognitive mechanisms, the information they 
have about themselves versus others, and overall mood”.  Further he emphasizes existence of 
several effects influencing the ability to manage projects “on-time”, “on-budget”, and “to 
specifications” (Pinto, 2013, p. 645). Pinto (2013, p. 645) refers to implications made by Buehler 
et. al (1994) when explaining project scheduling and planning fallacy:  
“People in general are more likely to underestimate their own, but not others’, completion 
times”. 
“When people make estimates they prefer focusing on plan-based scenarios and ignore relevant 
past experiences”.  
“People undervalue the previous experience and tend to see it as problems caused by 
independent factors and “other people’s personal mistakes””.  
 
The problem of failure in projects is a serious issue and according to various researches it is a 
result of many reasons. Thus, mainly projects fail as a result of wrong estimates and ignorance of 
information (Pinto, 2013, cited in Bent Flyvbjerg et.al, 2009). Pinto (2013, p. 645) defines wrong 
estimates as “delusion caused by orientation on inside view of the project focusing only on the 
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plan itself”. He seriously criticizes this “inside view”, defining it as “a bottom-up decision 
making process that discounts the wealth of historical data, past experiences, and environmental 
factors that are likely to affect the projects” (Pinto, 2013, p.645, cited in Flyvbjerg, et.al , 2009). 
 
In order to explain harmful effect of “delusion” (Pinto, 2013) uses combination of some 
techniques. For example he uses term of “planning fallacy” which is caused by anchoring and 
adjustment (Pinto, 2013, p. 645). “Anchoring” has negative influence because people forget that 
this “number is actually artificially derived” (Pinto, 2013, p. 646). In order to demonstrate how 
critical it is to use a “right starting point” for accurate assumptions he gives example of London 
Olympics project, where “cost raised from initial  £1.8 billion in 2002 to £11+billion in 2012” 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 646). Interesting fact is that “planners already knew that Barcelona had cost of  
£8.06 billion in 1992 already and Beijing had £9.8 billion in 2008”  (Pinto, 2013, p. 646).  
 
The second “deadly mistake” called by Pinto (2013, p. 646) is “massaging the plan”. He explains 
that sometimes “managers tend to shrink the plan according to their own understandings of the 
plan and this is mainly issue of trust, or different perception and better knowledge of the plan” 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 646). If one team member offers to the decision making body his plan he is 
likely to adjust it to make sure the “top level” will find it “right” and approve it (Pinto, 2013, p. 
646). But, apart of these issues Pinto (2013, p:646, cited in Flyvbjerg, 2005) suggests other 
motives such as “strategic misinterpretation” principle: “sometimes there are political motives to 
underestimate project costs and schedules”. Pinto (2013, p. 646) gives example of Boston’s 
Central Tunnel/Artery project, with initial cost of $2.54 billion, and final cost of $15 billion. In 
order to find out the reason Pinto (2013, p. 646) proposes to look at problem through two 
questions: “poor estimates?” or “planners did it on purpose in order to get project approved?” 
 
In order to answer these questions Pinto (2013, pp. 646-647) suggests the following 
explanations: “1. When projects are honestly estimated they will follow initial deadlines of 
completion, no matter how much they were changed after. He supports this argument by the fact 
that many projects that are considered to be late at the time of completion actually are just 
following their original, “true deadline”. 2. Project teams and their leaders are reacting on the 
project cuts in cost or deadline, by investing more effort in other parts of the projects in order to 
meet those expectations. Thus, at the end they are not avoiding costs, but may be even paying 
more than expected”. Of course, at the first look “it might give illusion that they did all what is 
possible in order to prevent these “costs” and “meet deadlines”” (Pinto, 2013, p. 647).  
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The third mistake described by Pinto (2013, p. 647) is “Creating project death marches”. Pinto 
(2013,p.647, cited in Yourdon, 2004) explains this expression as “projects that are initially “born 
to fail” under demands of a company and relying on expectation that team will manage somehow 
to survive the project”. In other words Pinto (2013, p. 647) considers “the death march as 
projects whose parameters exceed the norm by at least 50%”. He explains it in the following 
way: “1. The schedule is compressed and is 50% shorter than was supposed to be; 2. The number 
of project team members is 50% less than was supposed to be; 3. The budget and other required 
resources are 50% less than were supposed to be” (Pinto, 2013, p. 647). Pinto (2013, p. 647) also 
points that “external factors add additional pressure” on this. As example he gives assumption 
that may be “competition was so high among companies so that in order to win the bid they had 
to show “nice numbers” and after firm simply could not support to hire required amount of 
people or support the project team” (Pinto, 2013, p. 647). All these factors have impact on 
project from the very beginning, and there is no exact answer on why it is happening (Pinto, 
2013).   
 
Pinto (2013, p. 647) made a conclusion that massive projects fail despite their efforts to perform 
just because they were “initially set up to failure due to the conditions they were under”.  
 
Fourth mistake caused by “End date-driven schedules” defined by Pinto (2013, p. 647) as very 
dangerous since it brings more harm than it seems. From first look it seems to be reasonable to 
plan things and “set a certain deadline, but then managers fall into the trap: they simply organize 
and plan things not from the initial start, but orienting on the dead-line” (Pinto, 2013, p. 648). 
Pinto (2013, p. 648) sees this situation more as a “demotivating rather than challenging, because 
very often team members and managers after receiving the plan based on dead-line do not have 
enough resources to complete it on time”. Thus he points that “must be completed on deadline 
principle does not work” (Pinto, 2013, p. 648). Second negative impact described by Pinto 
(2013, p. 648) is that once deadlines are announced the scheduling starts to be planned without 
taking seriously many other factors. “Very often managers and the team driven by the deadline 
simply ignore or underestimate important issues related to comprehensive planning, risk 
assessment, scope development, and numerous other elements” (Pinto, 2013, p. 648).  The 
conclusion made by Pinto (2013, p. 648): “if schedule is driven mainly by deadline there should 
be commitment and support from the top management and ability to provide all necessary 
resources and support costs”.  
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Fifth mistake happens when there is “Lack of relevant project management training” (Pinto, 
2013, p. 648). Pinto (2013, p. 648) compares this problem with “phenomenon known as 
“knowledge management””. Thus he argues that really experienced and qualified managers after 
aging leave the company taking their knowledge with them (Pinto, 2013, p. 648). Organization 
on the other hand remains with less experienced staff that has to learn all those skills on their 
own (Pinto, 2013, p. 648). The cost of such “learning through experience often costs a lot for the 
company and achieved through many trials and errors made by new staff” (Pinto, 2013, p. 648).  
 
Sixth mistake is caused by “poor change control” (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). Sometimes it happens 
that during the project implementation environment simply changes and it is very important to be 
flexible enough to adapt to those shifts (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). If the team is not managing to bring 
all required modifications during the process they face so called “rework” (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). 
Pinto (2013, p. 649) describes this process as a “result of failure caused by the wrong estimates”. 
It happens when “team cannot adequately point all possible problems related to technical, 
commercial and developmental issues” (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). This “rework” means stepping 
back to the earlier stage of the project and starting from the beginning, which can be really 
painful (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). He explains that “rework is important part in the project 
management, despite the fact that many organizations do not like it. Some of them simply ignore 
it thus putting the whole project at risk” (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). Pinto (2013, p. 649) based on his 
own experience and research has concluded that “it is impossible to eliminate all the causes of 
rework”. Instead he recommends paying attention at the following reasons causing the rework 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 649): 
“Changing requirements – better to get the specifications right before the project is completed”; 
“Engineering “gold plating”, - the desire to continuously add features outside of the initial scope 
in order to give the project a bigger “wow” factor”; 
“Poor initial planning and scoping – when engaging in bad planning, critical steps or activities 
are neglected, which always come back to haunt the project”. 
 
Pinto (2013, p. 649) warns that referring to rework should be done carefully. He suggests using 
Cooper’s (1994) distinction between “known and undiscovered rework” (Pinto, 2013, p. 649). 
While known rework is predictable in terms of costs and scope, undiscovered rework can be time 
costly and it is really difficult to estimate it (Pinto, 2013, p. 649).  
 
Final mistake defined by Pinto (2013, p. 649) is “Superficial risk management”. 
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Risk is uncertain situation or unexpected event that causes damages (Pinto, 2013, p. 650). There 
are many techniques and strategies in order to overcome risk, but there is no common one for all 
projects (Pinto, 2013). Pinto (2013, p. 650) suggests thinking about risk as “a product of two 
dimensions: likelihood and consequence”. In other words risks should be identified in terms of 
“probability or likelihood and managers should be aware of possible consequences” (Pinto, 
2013, p. 650). Pinto (2013, p. 650) gives very good illustration for uncertainty. 
 
Figure 2.1 Timeline of uncertainty (Pinto,2013) 
Pinto (2013, p. 650) refers to this figure as very good illustration on risk management and 
approaches. Here we see both types of responses towards uncertainties: “proactive and reactive” 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 650). Practice shows that most of the time managers and teams are using reactive 
response on a certain event (Pinto, 2013, p. 650). This leads to the problems because they see 
only top of the iceberg. “The real problem is not event itself, it is a result of existing 
opportunities and threats that were actually obvious since the beginning” (Pinto, 2013, p. 650). 
Thus, “identifying the real reason of event will lead to the proactive response which is more 
efficient and gives better results” (Pinto, 2013, p. 650). Pinto (2013, p.650) emphasizes the 
importance of proactive response stating that “proactive management is about responding to 
events and learning from them in order to plan better in the future.” He explains that “in order to 
use risk management fully and get effective results managers and teams should learn to see the 
“whole picture”” (Pinto, 2013, p. 650). Very often managers avoid or do not notice particular 
parts, in this case he underlies importance of “learning loops” (Pinto, 2013, p. 650).  “Learning 
loops” help better plan for the future using risk management on full capacity (Pinto, 2013, p. 
651). 
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After identifying critical mistakes related to human element, Pinto (2013) proposes certain 
suggestions that can help minimize the negative effect of possible mistakes and to be ready for 
different outcomes. His first suggestion is based on findings of Flyvbjerg (2007) called 
“reference class forecasting” (Pinto, 2013, p. 651). This term is about identifying the common 
path in systematic project overruns within classes of projects and using it for future prevention of 
human bias based on “over-optimistic” estimation (Pinto, 2013, p. 651).  “This method is based 
on previous experience and historical data of similar projects in order to make more realistic 
assumptions about possible future outcomes” (Pinto, 2013, p. 651). Thus, he gives again 
example of London Olympics and its comparison with similar projects. If we rely on this method 
it is obvious that actually planners of London Olympics could have made more accurate 
predictions (Pinto, 2013, p. 651). Pinto (2013, p. 651)proposes the following table made by 
Flyvbjerg (2007). 
 
Table 2.1. Estimation errors by project class 
Type of project Average accuracy 
Rail 44.7% 
Bridge and Tunnel 33.8% 
Road 20.4% 
All 27.0% 
Source: Flyvbjerg (2007) (Pinto, 2013) 
   
Pinto’s (2013, p. 651) second suggestion is about “rework as a necessary part of the process in 
project development”. Though he agrees that “making predictions based on historical data and 
still accepting rework as a normal event might sound controversial” (Pinto, 2013, p. 651). Here 
managers have to be really flexible to see the process of rework not as unexpected negative 
event, but as a tool to correct something despite planned schedule (Pinto, 2013, p. 652).  
 
The third deadline mistake identified by Pinto (2013) is really a result of human factor and might 
depend on personality type of manager and team members. As Pinto (2013, p. 652) was listing 
“seven sins” which bring project to the failure, “self-interest and self-protection” influence the 
numbers shown for project approval. Sometimes explains Pinto (2013, p. 652) that “realistic 
numbers and data” shown by managers related to costs or deadline might be specially tailored for 
their top managers in order “to get approval and in order to protect themselves from “aggressive 
bosses””. Here we can see that the concept of new management style where the leadership has to 
go hand by hand with cooperation plays critical role. “Authenticity” in this case is described by 
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Pinto (2013, p. 652) as a “conscious decision to be true to one-self and forget about self-
protection, in other words not to be influenced by fear”. He recommends “prior to the schedule 
being finalized, all project duration estimates be reassessed as 50/50 probabilities” (Pinto, 2013, 
p.652, cited in Goldratt, 1997). This according to Pinto (2013, p. 652) gives “freedom to project 
management and releases the fear of punishment”. As a result this solution is helping to achieve 
two crucial things in project: “1. Improving the actual project delivery and 2. Improving 
relationships between managers and team members” (Pinto, 2013, p. 652). This solution is based 
on mutual trust when everybody is working for the overall benefit (Pinto, 2013, p. 652). 
Authenticity defined by Pinto (2013, p. 652) within this situation is very critical when it comes 
to the contractor-client relationships. He defines “common dynamic of this relationships as very 
complicated based on: promising much, bidding low and renegotiating” (Pinto, 2013, p. 652). 
“This situation is very harmful for the relationships, mutual trust and the project outcome” 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 652). Conclusion made by Pinto (2013, p. 652) is that authenticity is a key to 
mutual trust and good relationship based on transparency.  
 
Fourth suggestion is for “Planning in segments, not just wholes” (Pinto, 2013, p. 652). 
Pinto (2013, p. 652) suggests that “projects are already complicated, so in order to start making 
changes or solving problems it is reasonable to divide them onto segments and start applying 
solutions on them”.  This he believes will make task more simple and will lead to better results 
(Pinto, 2013, p. 652). 
 
2.2 Royal Dutch Shell scenario planning principles 
 
The company Royal Dutch Shell started applying its famous scenario planning in 1967.  “The 
first formal scenario proposed by Shell was completed in 1971” (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). 
“According to research on 77 large companies conducted by Rene Rohrbeck of Aarhus 
University and Jan Oliver Schwarz of Germany’s EBS Business School this method is being 
used outside the company due to its effectiveness” (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). “Conclusion 
made by researchers showed that this method helped to be ready to perceive change; better 
interpretation and responding to change; influence on other actors and better organizational 
learning” (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). 
 
RDS scenario planning  
12 
 
“Whenever life becomes more hectic and uncertain, scenario planning becomes more popular”,- 
Kees van der Heijden (Kahane, 2012). 
 
Kees van der Heijden suggests that scenario planning method has proved itself “as a successful 
diagnostic tool” (Kahane, 2012). By summarizing the core ideas of this method he identifies 
“three main focus areas: 1. Systemic diagnosis of the situation and its context; 2. Network 
development to enable self-reinforcing coping behavior; and 3. Personal identification with the 
project” (Kahane, 2012). 
 
“Shell scenario planning also known as transformative scenario planning was used in South 
African transformation” (Kahane, 2012). Adam Kahane (2012) described step by step how 
method used by RDS company was applied in South Africa based on own experience. In a 
situation for South Africa he was giving advices about “building team in order to construct 
scenarios” (Kahane, 2012). He suggested that team have to consist of people who could “look at 
South African situation from challenging alternative perspectives” (Kahane, 2012). Normally 
Shell was using this method by involving staff within its own organization (Kahane, 2012) But 
this time organizers of scenario decided to include “current and potential leaders from across the 
whole of the emerging South African social-political-economic system” (Kahane, 2012). This 
decision was based on believe that “diverse team will have different perspectives on situation 
and will be more credible while presenting its conclusions to the whole country” (Kahane, 2012). 
The scenario method according to Kahane (2012) “asks people to talk not about what they 
predict will happen or what they believe should happen but only about what they think could 
happen”. He explains that “at the end of the 6 month team came up with four possible scenarios: 
“Ostrich”, “Lame Duck”, “Icarus” and “Flight of the Flamingoes”” (Kahane, 2012). ““Icarus” 
was the one with biggest impact that was about unconstrained democratic government that 
ignored fiscal limits and crashed the economy” (Kahane, 2012). He emphasizes that “while the 
decision making part has choice to accept or reject, in both cases scenario has impact” (Kahane, 
2012). But one thing was for sure: “they lead to change and transformation, and Mont Fleur 
contributed to creating peaceful forward movement in a society that was violently stuck” 
(Kahane, 2012). Kahane (2012) presented this approach as “invention born of necessity”. 
 
This method “made contribution to change in South Africa” and Kahane (2012) suggested 
several questions to consider for this method: “How this way of working could be used in other 
context? In which type of situation this method could be useful? Which factors would influence 
success: inputs and outputs? Which steps were the most essential?” 
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Regarding the “when to use this method?” Kahane (2012) recommends applying it “when people 
find themselves in a situation that has following three characteristics:  
1. Situation is seen as unacceptable, unstable or unsustainable 
2. People involved in this situation cannot transform situation on their own or by working 
only with their friends and colleagues.  
3. People cannot transform the situation directly. The actors are too polarized to be able to 
see it differently”. 
In order to know “how this method works?”, Kahane (2012) suggests his vision on “four-part 
logic: 
1. transformation of their understandings 
2. transformation of their relationships 
3. transformation of their intentions 
4. transformation of their actions as a result of previous transformation”. 
In order to “generate this transformation” Kahane (2012) states that there should be “three 
components” and the ““whole system will work only if all of them are present”: 
1. “Team consisting of insightful, influential, and interested actors”. All of them should 
have different perspectives and views, and they should not be only observers. 
2. “Strong container”. In order to build such container there should be special attention 
given to multiple dimensions of the space where participants work. Among them he 
mentions political positioning, psychological conditions and physical locations of the 
meetings. These are conditions according to him that will “enable participants feel safe, 
comfortable and challenge their own thoughts and meet their counterparts from other 
parts of the system”. 
3.  “Rigorous process”: he warns that this method means that “actors construct a set of 
relevant, challenging, plausible, and clear stories about what could happen – not about 
what will happen (a forecast) or about what should happen (a wish or proposal) - and 
then act on what they have learned from this construction””.  
 
“Transformative scenario planning was adapted at Mont Fleur and is based on adaptive scenario 
which is invention of Shell” (Kahane, 2012). Kahane (2012) clearly explains that there are 
“similarities and differences in both methods”. As a key difference he defines “purpose”. He sees 
that “adaptive scenario is using stories about possible futures”, while “transformative is targeted 
on using stories in order to influence what could happen” (Kahane, 2012). 
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2.3 Critical success factors and scenario planning 
 
Strategic planning is important for company and there are different factors influencing this 
process: organization’s mission, vision, goals, organizational structure (Parker Gates, 2010). 
Some researchers suggest using method of CSF or “critical success factor” (Parker Gates, 2010).  
Linda Parker Gates (2010) from Software engineering institute defines certain “critical success 
factors” which can influence the outcome of the project. In her research Parker Gates (2010) 
tried to connect CSF with scenario planning.  
 
The concept CSF offered by Parker Gates (2010) is explained through following characteristics: 
CSF hierarchy, types, uniqueness and stability over time. 
 
Based on Daniel’s (1961) work she explains that “concept of hierarchy of CSF might slightly 
differ under different circumstances” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 9). “It can be seen as a unique for 
all companies in one industry or can actually differ from company to company and from 
manager to manager” (Parker Gates, 2010, p.9, cited in Anthony 1972). 
 
 
The figure below shows how Caralli (2004) and Rockart (1979) see this hierarchy (Parker Gates, 
2010, p. 10).  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Hierarchy of CSF (Parker Gates, 2010) 
“CSF types”: According to Rockart (1979) there are five types of CSF (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 
10):  
• “The structure of the particular industry (Industry CSFs); 
• Competitive strategy, industry position, and geographical location (strategy CSF); 
• The macro environment (environment CSF); 
• Problems or challenges to the organization (temporal CSFs); 
• Management perspective (management CSFs)” 
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“CSF uniqueness”: Parker Gates (2010, p. 11) compares Caralli’s vision with Rockarts: “Caralli 
sees uniqueness depending on industry, organization or manager and Rockart sees it at 
managerial level and assumes that it could be non-unique or linked to internal or external 
factors”. 
 
“CSF stability over time: Rockart (1979) in his findings underlies that CSF might change over 
time due to the change in external or internal environment” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 11). 
Apparently he warns that “CSF might not necessarily be applicable to all divisions of 
organization and might change due to the changing goals” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 11). 
 
Strategic planning, Future scenarios and CSF 
 
When managers plan they should think strategically and plan strategically (Parker Gates, 2010, 
p. 21). What is the difference between strategic thinking and planning? Parker Gates comments 
in a following way: “a common criticism of strategic planning is that it is overly involved with 
extrapolation of the past and present and can create the illusion of certainty regarding the future” 
(Parker Gates, 2010, p.21 cited in Heracleous, 1998). She offers to consider analysis of two 
concepts made by Jeanne Liedtka. According to Liedtka (1998) “strategic thinking consists of 
five elements: a systems perspective, a focus on intention, a focus on time, a focus on 
opportunity, and hypothesis testing” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 22).  She is describing strategic 
process as “a non-static activity with continuous adaptability and change” (Parker Gates, 2010, 
p. 22). 
 
Figure below reflects integrity of strategic planning, future scenarios and CSF  
 
 
Figure 2.3 The strategic Process: Strategic Planning and Strategic Thinking (Parker Gates, 
2010) 
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But Parker Gates (2010, p. 22) warns about “strategy paradox” described by Raynor (2007) who 
explains that “uncertainty increases when time passes, so he suggests separating management of 
commitments from management of uncertainty”.  
 
Parker Gates (2010, p. 23) concludes that identifying critical success factors can help to better 
plan and propose different future scenarios. 
 
2.4 Scenario planning as a management tool 
 
Scenario planning by KPMG 
 
Due to its effectiveness scenario planning has become one of the tools and methods for strategic 
planning in different industries (KPMG, 2011). Companies choose it because they see it as 
unique and universal helping to make strategic planning in a more flexible way (KPMG, 2011, p. 
5). KPMG consulting (2011, p.5) recommends this method as “a way to managing future”.  
KPMG (2011) is using this method for consulting its clients. It has classified scenarios into 
different types according to the aim (KPMG, p.4-5). 
Table 2.2 Types of scenario planning offered by KPMG (2011,pp.4-5): 
Type of 
scenario 
Characteristics Time 
horizon 
Concepts and examples 
Quantitative Describe future in terms of relatively 
hard facts and numbers. Typically 
embody potential best and worst 
outcome 
Can reflect 
short-term 
planning 
horizon 
Involve concept of return 
on investment. E.g: Effect 
of weather delays on a 
project 
Multi-
dimensional 
Depict futures in terms of multiple, 
interrelated events and drivers. 
Typically economic in nature based on 
historic data 
Planning 
horizon is 
usually 
short 
E.g.: Effect on the 
economy or 
organization’s revenue 
performance if 
unemployment, interest 
rates and oil prices 
increase at the same time 
Event Seek to explain how the future is 
determined by a single significant 
Usually 
medium 
They tend to be more 
proactive than reactive. 
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event, often one that arises in an 
organization’s external environment 
term E.g: Iceland volcanic 
eruption 
Strategic Describe possible futures in broad 
terms 
Reflect 
long-term 
planning 
horizon 
They are essentially 
proactive. 
E.g: effect of the iPhone 
on a mobile phone 
manufacturer 
 
Scenario planning method is applicable to different types of projects, the most important is to 
“understand project objectives and stakeholder expectations” (KPMG, 2011, p. 12).  
 
Future uncertainty is the challenge that scenario planning aims to resolve. KPMG (2011, p. 6) 
suggests classifying uncertainties into three categories: 
  
 
Figure 2.4 Three types of uncertainties (KPMG, 2011) 
 
Scenario planning according to KPMG (2011, p. 12) findings aims to find “non-obvious and 
hidden linkages and relationships”. For this reason KPMG (2011, p. 12) suggests considering 
“several questions that should be asked for successful scenario planning”: 
- “Who are the participants, the stakeholders and the owners of the exercise?”; 
- “What is the specific purpose of the exercise?”; 
- “What are the key future events that should be examined?”; 
- “When in the future are these events (scenarios) going to occur?”; 
- “Why are these future events occurring? (What is it that is driving or causing them?)” 
 
Organization 
Industry 
uncertainties 
Environment 
uncertainties 
Type of risks: risks and opportunities within the organization 
which can be controlled. 
Possible scenario approches: understand events which might 
cause severe operational risk outcomes and consider the 
impacts on the business model 
Type of risks: risks and opportunities within the industry 
which can only be influenced, not controlled. 
Possible scenario approches: understand events which might 
cause severe operational risk outcomes and consider the 
impacts on the busniess model 
Type of risks: risk and opportunities within the broader 
business environment which cannot be controlled or 
influenced. 
Possible scenario approaches: understand events and 
potential threats to the organization's stratgey and viability 
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In order to better plan KPMG (2011, p. 12) recommends five key phases for scenario planning 
process: 
Figure 2.5 Phases of scenario planning (KPMG, 2011, p.12) 
KPMG (2011, p. 12) gives the following explanation regarding each step: “first step is about 
scanning internal and external environment for emerging trends and issues; at the second step it 
is recommended to build one or more scenarios choosing from four types of scenarios; third 
stage is about identifying impacts and planning strategic and operational responses for each of 
the scenarios; fourth step is about identifying the five the most realistic futures and working 
particularly with them; fifth step is about implementing those responses for the possible 
scenarios when they are most likely to happen”. 
 
Like any other method or technique this method also faces certain challenges.  
KPMG (2011, p. 13) based on experience has identified potential “pitfalls” and recommends 
“solutions/options” for them: 
Table 2.3 Potential pitfall of scenario planning and solutions (KPMG, 2011) 
Potential pitfalls Options/Solutions 
Bias: 
 Motivational 
 Availability/Reporting 
 Anchoring 
 Partition Dependence 
 Overconfident/ Underconfident 
 Culture 
 Group think 
 
Scenario techniques and design to account for 
bias 
Relevance Participants, preparation, knowledge/data 
Longevity and resilience Variety/ different techniques: 
 Challenge 
 External data 
 Peer review 
Scan internal 
and external 
environment 
Build possible 
scenarios 
Plan response 
Identify 
realistic 
futures 
Capitalise on 
those futures 
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Finally, KPMG (2011, p. 14) recommends using scenario planning method for “Governance, risk 
and compliance” (GRC) which “will lead to convergence and transparency of information during 
whole process”. 
 
2.5  The human factor in project management 
 
The methods described earlier in this paper have one thing in common - “human factor”.  
Zachary Wong (2007) from Chevron Energy Technology believes that “human factor deserves 
more attention than before and behavioral management will be more popular in the future”. 
 
Wong (2007) advocates the idea of “not just to get results but to get results the right way”. He 
defines a new definition of success in project management through the concept “getting results 
and feeling good about it” (Wong, 2007). 
 
Figure below illustrates his vision of project success: 
Meeting people’s 
expectations 
 
 
 
High 
Partial Success 
 
Success  
Failure 
 
Low  
Partial Success 
 
High 
Meeting Project Expectations 
Figure 2.6 Project success (Wong, 2007) 
This figure reflects Wong’s (2007) believes regarding success: “when both expectations meet at 
a high level success will be guaranteed”. He suggests that “first it should be project and human 
expectations to be met” (Wong, 2007). By “project expectations” he means: “results meet project 
objectives, which includes being on-time, on spec and within budget”(Wong, 2007). By 
“people’s expectations” he defines: “the values are respected, people feel fulfilled, and they 
succeed together as a team” (Wong, 2007).  
 
Wong (2007) sees a “project as one system where all factors are influencing each other”. In order 
to explain it he used “three spaces of project management” concept. This concept shows how 
organizational, team and personal space are interrelated (Wong, 2007). 
20 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Three spaces of project management (Wong, 2007) 
Wong (2007) links “Personal space and human factor” to theories of Maslow, Herzberg’s dual 
factors, and McGregor’s Theory. All of them are aimed to explain “human behavior patterns and 
motives of decision making” (Wong, 2007). I will not describe these theories in details since my 
aim in this paper is to define the managerial mistake in project management and to explain how 
better to plan in uncertain environment. 
 
“Team performance” by Wong (2007) explained through “team performance depending on three 
key elements: content, process and behavior”. These elements like other methods described in 
this paper are applicable for all types of projects, organizations and work teams (Wong, 2007). 
 
2.8 Team performance elements (Wong, 2007) 
Wong (2007) explains these key elements as follows: 
“Content is defined as: “the “what” or intent of the team – the vision, objectives, direction, 
opportunities, strategies, and assumptions”; 
“Process is: “the “how” – the tools and procedures that help a team reach its objectives”; 
Behavior: “collective human interactions of the team””. 
 
Each of these elements according to Wong (2007) “require certain conditions to be met”. In 
order to create “Content” there should be: “project team charter for setting clear goals and 
Manaegement 
system 
Organizational 
space 
Team space 
Human factors 
Personal Space 
Content 
Behavior Process 
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agenda; air cover for the team for getting all necessary support (financial, political, etc.) and 
funding, and importance of identifying bias at the early stages” (Wong, 2007). 
 
The “Process” as understood from the word refers to “taking actions after deciding on “what” to 
do” Wong (2007). Wong (2007) defines a “good team process” through five key attributes: 
1. “It depersonalizes the topic issue”; 
2. “It increases transparency among team members”; 
3. “It makes the discussion more objective and less emotional”; 
4. “It creates an inclusive, participative environment”; 
5. “It gives each team member equal power”. 
 
As for the “Behavior” Wong (2007) identified “top six team behaviors”: 
1. “Mutual trust”; 
2. “Interdependency”; 
3. “Accountability”; 
4. “Valuing individual differences”; 
5. “Transparency”; 
6. “Learning and recognition”. 
 
Finally the “Personal space” in the project management is important as “all processes in the 
organization or project are performed by people it should not be underestimated” (Wong, 2007). 
Wong (2007) shows through the figure below how behavior is influenced by values and 
consequences. 
 
 
2.9 Values, behaviors and consequences (Wong, 2007) 
Values Behaviors Consequences 
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It seems from the first look that there is logical sequence that builds this chain: “values form 
certain behaviors and behaviors bring to consequences” (Wong, 2007). But as we see from the 
figure: acknowledgment of possible consequences by people can influence their behavior 
(usually it is fear) (Wong, 2007). Values on the other hand are shaped by culture, experiences 
and personality type (Wong, 2007). 
 
Wong (2007) also emphasized that “a leader should have well balanced personality type: it 
should be balanced between intellectual and emotional”. “This balance is important because both 
intellectual and emotional needs of a person shape motivation for action” (Wong, 2007). Finally 
Wong (2007) states that: “The power of human factor is understanding motivation. How we 
motivate and develop people is determined by their talents and dynamics, as well as the 
competitive challenges of company objectives and strategies”. 
 
2.6 Criticism on Scenario planning 
 
Shell is well known for its scenario planning, but despite the fact of using for 40 years, it is 
facing criticism for not being accurate enough. Peter Foster from Financial Post referred to one 
case of Shell scenario as “Shell’s solar scenario fantasies” (Foster, 2013). He argues that the 
scenario planning method offered by Shell actually is wrong, as he stated “the further out you 
look, and the broader your perspective, the more wrong you will be” (Foster, 2013). All this 
harsh criticism is addressed to the whole concept of building scenarios by Shell. As evidence he 
gives examples of scenarios proposed by Shell about “solar panels being the most important 
single energy source by 2100” (Foster, 2013). Another criticism was about “New Lenses 
Scenario”. He is not agreeing on accuracy of these scenarios and gives example of “another 
projections back in 1992 which were promising to have tens millions of electric cars on the road 
by 2013” (Foster, 2013). Very important point of his argumentation is about “cleaner” energy: 
“according to Shell’s CEO Peter Voser the environmental problems occurred for four decades 
were linked to the one single source- bad policy” (Foster, 2013). According to Foster (2013) “the 
need for this “cleaner” energy was based on decrease in fossil fuels and partly on man-made 
climate change”. “But there are a lot of other opinions about climate change and alternative 
sources” argues Foster (2013). As for New Lenses Scenario it consists of two different scenarios: 
“Mountains” and “Oceans” (Foster, 2013). The ““Mountains” sees natural gas as the most 
important energy source by the 2030s” (Foster, 2013). The ““Oceans” sees solar power 
becoming the top source by about 2070” (Foster, 2013). Foster (2013) finds the idea about solar 
energy rise as “the most bizarre” because “companies like BP have pulled out of it several years 
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ago”. He comments that “Shell uses as an argument “public pressure” to influence solar energy 
boom” (Foster, 2013). But he comments further “alternative sources have a lot of drawbacks, 
such as: high costs due to the inefficiency of the technology and generating capacity when the 
clouds roll in” (Foster, 2013). Next criticism is about “the lack of the alternative option in such 
scenarios, such as what if the “climate crisis” proves to be non-existent” (Foster, 2013). Foster 
(2013) concludes his critical article by mentioning what once was said by Warren Buffet about 
forecasting: “Forecasts tell you little about the future but a lot about the forecaster”. 
 
Research conducted by Alex Wright from University of Wolverhampton in 2004 criticizes the 
scenario planning process of Royal Dutch Shell Company. His paper concentrates on the work of 
Kees van der Heijden and Paul J.H. Schoemaker as: “representing the influence of this 
approach” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). In other words he means that it is them who form and influence 
this approach (Wright, 2004). Wright (2004) criticizes approach and shows key points: social 
and constructive natures of scenarios. Thus he concludes that the “objectivity of authors is 
misleading and highly subjective” (Wright, 2004, p.8). 
 
Wright (2004, p. 8) in his research describes all steps of the scenario planning from ontological 
and epistemological point of view. First step according to Shell scenario planning is – 
“structuring the scenario process” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). “At this stage a company has to identify 
strategic issue, question or problem that has a critical impact on the organization and its business 
around which scenarios are built” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). Wright (2004, p. 8) sees this stage as a 
“demonstration of the RDS2 experience”. “RDS identifies key factors having the most influence 
on the business” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). In this case he suggests “the factors as oil reserves and 
price have disproportionate effect on the dynamics in business” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). But he 
continues “these variables are outside of the organizations’ immediate areas of control and 
influence” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). He underlies that “for that particular period of time and for that 
particular company they were the most critical issues and it was logical to build scenarios around 
them” (Wright, 2004, p. 8).  But as Wright (2004, p. 8) argues: “most organizations conduct their 
business in a more complex environment, where multiple variables interact in confusing and 
unpredictable ways”. He also mentions that “service-based organizations continually interact 
with their environment and their interpretations shape the environment more than the 
environment shapes them” (Wright, 2004, p.8, cited in Clark, 2004; Nathan, 2004). That is why 
Wright (2004, p. 8) finds very difficult to “identify the main issue for organizations”. He 
comments that “ontological assumptions of the RDS scenarios are that the future itself would be 
                                                          
2
 Royal Dutch Shell 
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predominantly affected by one of a small number of variables that were independent of it” 
(Wright, 2004, p.8, cited in Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe, 2002). That is why Wright (2004, 
p. 8) suggests” it is critical and important to identify issue or hypothesis first, than the scenario 
should be built”. “This will also influence where and how the data will be collected and what are 
responses going to be” (Wright, 2004, p. 8). 
 
Second stage of the RDS scenario planning is about – “exploring the scenario context” (Wright, 
2004, p. 8). Wright (2004, p. 9) critics about this stages starts from the word “exploring”. He 
argues that: “the verb explore used in this circumstance is not neutral; its use suggests that the 
scenario context exists independently of the explorer(s), locating their role as being to enter this 
domain in order to understand its characteristics, much like an explorer when entering an alien 
land” (Wright, 2004, p. 9). He suggests that using verb “create” as more accurate (Wright, 2004, 
p.9). Wright’s (2004, p. 9) disagreement based on the fact that “the scenario context doesn’t exist 
independently of the scenario team to be explored, on the contrary it is created collectively and is 
a social construction”. Second argument of Wright (2004, p. 9) against scenarios is based on 
“approach” for this process. Thus, he criticizes van der Heijden, et al (2002), because “the word 
explore instead of create actually makes a distance between individuals within organization and 
the consultants from outside of the organization from the results they co-produce” (Wright, 2004, 
p. 9). The next criticism by Wright (2004, p. 9) falls on the concept of “remarkable people” used 
by van der Heijden. He argues that van der Heijden , et al. (2002) describes this category of 
people as “…observers who understand how the world works…” thus bringing “out of the box” 
thinking into the intervention (Wright, 2004, p. 9). Wright (2004, p. 9) agrees on the opinion 
about “professionalism of those “remarkable people””, but states that it is “exaggeration”. He 
underlies “importance of the external vision and perspectives as a crucial part of successful 
scenario building” (Wright, 2004, p.9). He questions believes of van der Heijden about 
considering opinion of “remarkable people” as “absolute knowledge of universal truth” (Wright, 
2004, p. 9).  
 
“Third stage is about “developing scenarios” and results in the creation of the scenarios as 
narratives” (Wright, 2004, p. 9). This stage involves “identifying the driving forces, their degree 
of uncertainty and potential impact on organization, the capture of the essence of the scenario 
end state, and a fleshing out of the storylines of the narratives” (Wright, 2004, p.9, cited in van 
der Heijden, et al., 2002 pp.225-227). “The next step is in identifying the two general areas that 
are deemed to have the highest level of uncertainty and potentially the highest impact on the 
issue or question around which the scenarios are being constructed” (Wright, 2004, p.9, cited in 
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Shoemaker, 1993). “Scenario planners are asked to place the cluster headings on the two-
dimensional axis depending on their view of uncertainty and impact (Wright, 2004, p.9, cited in 
van der Heijden, 2002 p.206). Wright (2004, p. 9) criticizes this stage as “being highly subjective 
because participants make sense and allocate a position upon the grid based on their own 
understanding and sense making”.  “These decisions on the other side are based on the 
discussions that take place at this stage” (Wright, 2004, p. 9). Wright (2004, p. 9) comments: 
“Through this stage the role of facilitators is presented as neutral and value-free”. “But in reality 
a cluster is uncertain just because majority of participants think so and they decide to place it on 
a certain quadrant” (Wright, 2004, p. 9). Further Wright (2004, p. 9) comments that by 
“capturing the essence scenario planners have positivist perspective of what makes a thing what 
it is and the necessary relations that comprise it of each scenario taken to its plausible extreme”. 
“Constructionism on the other hand advances an alternative view that worlds have no “essence” 
to be discovered as they are not given, but constantly made and remade” (Wright, 2004, p.9, 
cited in Czarniawska, 2001). 
 
Wright (2004, p. 10) further comments that “van der Heijden’s (cited 2002, p.214) himself has 
rationalist assumption about organization and its environment being separate and independent of 
each other: “…the scenarios themselves should never contain the organization as an actor. That 
is to say, the organization should not be shown to be having an input and impact on the story…”” 
Wright (2004, p. 10) continues his criticism through “Stakeholder analysis”. At this stage 
Wright (2004, p. 10) comments that “scenario planners are the ones who consider the relative 
degree of interest and power of the stakeholder”.  He suggests that “Van der Heijden at al. (2002) 
supports the idea of using matrix similar to Eden and Ackerman’s to “help separate reality from 
emotion”” (Wright, 2004, p. 10).  He explains that “Eden and Ackerman’s matrix helps to 
categorize stakeholders according to the level of power and interest assigned” (Wright, 2004, p. 
10). 
 
Criticism on “Systems check” (Wright, 2004, p.10) 
“According to van der Heijden (2002, p.219) scenario planners should use systems thinking at 
any time during storytelling phase in order to identify underlying causal relationships driving the 
stories as they are crafter together” (Wright, 2004, p. 10). Wright (2004, p. 10) comments that 
“this activity is said to challenge the internal consistency of the storylines”. Wright (2004, p.10) 
thinks that “value of stories lies in their usefulness to the organization not in their internal 
consistency”. 
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“Impacting organizational thinking and acting” (Wright, 2004, p.10) 
“After scenarios are developed a task of communicating them becomes important: it should be 
addressed to whom it was developed - key decision-makers” (Wright, 2004, p.10, cited in van 
der Heijden, et al., 2002). Wright (2004, p. 11) sees “two-fold purpose of this: to influence the 
eventual decisions taken, ensuring they are robust against each scenario or if they are not at least 
that the risks are known” (cited in Goodwin & Wright, 2001), thus stimulating strategic thinking 
and adaptive organizational learning skills through the strategic conversation (cited in Chesley & 
Wenger, 1999; van der Heijden, et al. 2002). Further, Wright (2004, p. 11) argues that “van der 
Heijden does not identify how this strategic conversation should be conducted”.  He gives 
example of “five categories of performative speech acts” by Ford and Ford (1995) seen as 
“important in producing intentional change in organizations: assertives, directives, commissives, 
expressives and declarations” (Wright, 2004, p. 11). Another critical point described by Wright 
(2004, p. 11) is that “organizations often interpret past successes as evidence of their competence 
and effectiveness of their methods, and consequently lock into these behaviors, and seek to 
generalize on their appropriateness for others”(cited in Nathan, 2004). He further comments that  
“scenario planners for over the last 20 years were using the same thinking that saw forecasting as 
the predominant strategic planning approach in the 60s and 70s” (Wright, 2004, p. 11). Thus 
“scenario planning process is missing important part of the research – self-reflectivity which is 
not considered when objectivity is assumed” (Wright, 2004, p. 11). A very good description 
about “relationship between social construction and reflexivity” is given by Wright (2004, p. 
11)based on Cunliffe’s summary: “Social constructionists argue that we construct and make 
sense of social realities in various forms of discourse; conversation, writing and reading. 
Radically reflexive researchers recognize their own place in this process, suggesting we 
construct inter-subjectively the very objective realities we think we are studying: we are 
inventors not representers of realities (cited in Clifford, 1986). Constructionist research explores 
how meaning is created between research participants (cited in Cunliffe, 2003 p.988)”. 
 
Conclusion 
Main theoretical points: 
Despite good planning, managers tend to make common “deadly mistakes” caused by the 
“human factor” (Pinto, 2013, p. 644). It is important to identify mistakes and learn from 
“learning loops” and be “proactive instead of reactive” (Pinto, 2013, pp. 650-651). Royal Dutch 
Shell scenario planning principles are widely used due to their “uniqueness and flexibility” 
(KPMG, 2011, p. 5). Adam Kahane (2012) recommends asking right “questions regarding when 
to use it and how it will work before applying this approach and providing certain conditions as 
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good team, good conditions and rigorous process”. Future planning can be done through 
identification of “Critical success factors” (Parker Gates, 2010). Parker Gates (2010, p. 22) 
warns about “strategy paradox” when “uncertainty increases by the time so it is better to separate 
management of commitments from management of uncertainty” (Parker Gates, 2012, p.22 cited 
in Raynor, 2007). KPMG (2011, p. 12) suggest that scenario planning finds “non-obvious and 
hidden linkages and relationships”. But KPMG (2011, p. 13) warns about “potential pitfalls 
linked to bias, relevance and longevity with resilience”. Zachary Wong (2007) suggests that 
“success is achieved when people’s expectations meet project expectations”. “Proper 
communication within organizational, team and personal spaces will bring more transparency” 
(Wong, 2007). Wong (2007) argues that “consequences form people’s behavior”. Criticism on 
RDS approach is based on “subjectivity of forecasts thus reflecting personal vision” (Foster, 
2013) and “socially constructive nature of scenarios” (Wright, 2004, p. 5). 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Timeframe of research 
 
The data sources are secondary and publicly available. Since I did not have opportunity for direct 
interviewing I was relying fully on official sources. There were a lot of ideas regarding the topic 
but it had to be enough to answer research questions and pass through the theoretical prism. That 
is why a lot of time was spent on data collection and realization whether it will fit within 
triangle: data, theory and research question. 
Table 2.4 The approximate timeframe of my research was as follows:  
Period Action 
01.01.2014-27.01.2014 Identifying the topic and research question 
28.01.2014 First requirement: Delivery of first proposal for 
master thesis 
29.01.2014-27.03.2014 Analysis of data and discussion with 
supervisors; narrowing down the data scope 
through phone calls, mails and consultations;  
Identifying the limitations on data; discussing 
the relevance of data 
28.03.2014 Second requirement: Review of progress 
01.04.2014 Analysis of data, theory and research 
questions; 
Discussions with supervisors 
07.05.2014 Work with remarks 
20.05.2014 Delivery 
The data availability, problem statement and research questions were discussed with my 
academic supervisor and other professors at university. These discussions helped me to narrow 
down the scope of my research. 
 
3.2 Thematizing and Designing 
 
At the beginning of research I have studied my topic briefly and decided to stick on it due to its 
relevance. Australia is “extending LNG boom” and most of the projects are quite new (Ellis, et 
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al., 2013, pp. 3-4). In order to set a design I have checked how much information is available in 
order to study the problem. Further, I had discussion with my supervisor regarding the data, 
theory and research questions frame. 
 
 
3.3 Research question development 
 
The research question was chosen due to the existing problems in Australian LNG projects and 
uncertain future perspectives. I decided to choose this topic due to its relevancy: demand for 
LNG in Asia Pacific is rising and Australia is planning to use its “national comparative 
advantage” (APPEA, 2013). The problem was found through brief overview of the obstacles and 
challenges faced by Australian LNG industry and interest in future perspectives. In order to open 
up a problem from different perspectives I described different approaches offered by companies, 
organizations and researchers. 
For better explanation of the problem I have stated two empirical sub-questions: 1)How have 
company management in fact made investment decisions for the Australian LNG projects?; 
2)Given the delays and cost-overruns what are the possible reasons for it? Was it possible to 
avoid those mistakes or was it just a “bad luck”? 
These questions are useful for specifying the scope of research and narrowing down focus. 
Because project management is complex process and making research on problems related to 
uncertainties can be very broad with different outcomes and visions. 
 
3.4  Philosophical position 
 
Any research should have particular ontological and epistemological position. Ontology refers to 
the “nature of reality” and epistemology is about “the ways of inquiring into the nature of the 
world” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, pp. 18-19). For the philosophical position Easterby-Smith 
et.al (2012, p. 19) describes two main positions: realism and relativism. As for epistemology he 
describes two methods of how research should be conducted: positivism and social 
constructionism (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 21). In order to understand the difference they 
gives the list of the criteria for both approaches. They reflect the position of researcher, aims, 
data types, starting points and designs (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 24) .  
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Positivistic approach refers to the “social world existing externally” and in order to measure its 
properties one should use “objective methods” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 22). Social 
constructionism approach on the other hand is described by Easterby-Smith et. al (2012, p. 23) as 
a “reality” based on social construction and “given meaning by people” instead. This approach 
reflects “reality” formed by people. Based on a research problem there can be one or 
combination of philosophies used. For my paper I decided to choose relativistic position and 
“inquire” it through social constructionism.  
The information was collected through secondary data and some of the interviews were readily 
available on public sources. The data was collected selectively due to the aim of the stated 
problem. I was trying to find answer to the question on why particular projects facing obstacles 
and what made them happen. The thesis itself does not have aim to give exact answer but rather 
to reflect the situation and see it from alternative perspective. This should help to reevaluate the 
vision of project management through influencing patterns that usually overlooked and to 
underlie that future is uncertain.  
 
3.5 Research design 
 
It is important to choose research design because it is the “framework or plan for a study as a 
guide in collecting and analyzing data” (Brown & Suter, 2012). There are three basic types of 
research design: exploratory, descriptive and causal.  Research design of this work is exploratory 
because it has “aim to better understand the situation and does not provide certain answers or 
decision” (Brown & Suter, 2012).  Approach used for this research is qualitative because “it 
begins with assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of theoretical lens, and the study of 
research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human 
problem” (Creswell, 2007, p. 37). Among qualitative approaches I have used case study. Case 
study is approach in which “researcher is exploring the case or cases through detailed data 
collection from multiple sources, and reports a case description and case-based themes” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 37). At the same time my research was descriptive in term of considering 
“description of certain projects together with their characteristics and relationships between 
variables” (Brown & Suter, 2012). Descriptive design is aimed to “answer the questions such as 
who, what, when, where and why before the data collection” (Brown & Suter, 2012).  
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3.6 Data collection and analysis 
 
I could not use in-depth interview method since the managers of the selected projects are not 
open for interviewing and I could not be an observer neither due to the lack of permission to do 
so. But while studying the project management and possible risks with obstacles I came out with 
the conclusion that basically managers use approximately same approach for the project 
planning. Thus in order to narrow down my data collection I decided to seek for advice from 
project manager who is familiar more or less with the process. Informal conversation as narrative 
story was very useful for me to extract necessary ideas about sort of information I should use for 
my work. Instead of describing the whole planning process in management I focused on the 
reasons why problems occur. Information on these issues was written by people involved in the 
project management and scenario planning process. 
 
3.7 Why I selected particular projects? 
 
I reflected problems of over cost and delays within particular projects due to the following 
reason: Pluto and Browse LNG projects were initially started by Australian company Woodside 
(operator). Despite negative experience they had in Pluto project they could not avoid similar 
problems with Browse project. Gorgon and Wheatstone are promising and among the largest 
projects in Australia. The project participants are experienced and leading companies such as 
Shell, Chevron (operator) and ExxonMobil. The projects are in same country face similar 
problems given that companies have different background. Moreover these companies had 
experience in working together in the similar LNG project in Australia North West Shelf. They 
were operating as a joint venture participants.  
 
 
3.8 Criticism, obstacles and limitations, validity and reliability issues 
 
While conducting research it is important to consider validity and reliability of the data. When 
we work with quantitative data we consider “external and internal validity in order to know how 
accurate we reflected our concept” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 45). As my research is based 
on qualitative secondary data I need to check its validity in a different way.  Easterby-Smith et. 
al (2012, p. 53) explains that for qualitative research it is rarely called as “validity” thus referring 
to Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) as they identified three key criteria: “authenticity, 
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plausibility and criticality”. By “authenticity” he suggests “convincing the reader by the author 
that he has deep understanding on what is going on within organization (Easterby-Smith, et al., 
2012, p. 53). By “plausibility” he suggests that the research should be linked to the “interest 
among other researchers” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 53). “Criticality” is important for 
“encouraging readers to question their initial assumptions regarding the subject and offer 
something new” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012, p. 54). I also used some data in order to question 
and disconfirm scenario planning method as it is not “cure all” but rather an alternative method 
which is also dependent on certain obstacles and limitations.  
The problems I faced within this thesis were linked to fitting into triangle: data, theory, research 
question. These three elements should coincide in order to create a whole picture. The problems 
with data collection occurred due to the lack of access for direct interviewing and detailed 
information on how projects were planned. At the same time I have realized that direct 
interviewing will not give me more information than it is provided in public sources. But the data 
used was written by people who had work experience in Shell and Chevron, the companies 
involved in some of Australian LNG projects. 
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4. Empirical findings 
 
4.1 Current situation for Australian LNG projects 
 
According to Ellis, et. al (2013) LNG has serious impact on Australian economy. Thus it is 
estimated that “existing and committed projects might contribute about US$ 538,325 billion 
(A$520 billion) to the economy during 2015 to 2025” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 4). These numbers 
show how important it is for Australia to have its LNG projects start on time and be competitive 
(Ellis, et al., 2013) . 
 
4.1 Map showing Australia’s major LNG projects in production, development and 
planning ( Leather & Wood, 2012) 
“Australia’s conventional gas projects are mainly situated in remote locations where limited 
infrastructure exists” (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 4).  From the map we can see that majority of 
projects are located in the Western Australia. In this paper I am studying Browse, Gorgon, 
Wheatstone projects and existing facilities NWSV and Pluto. As we will see further in the 
discussion location of projects also has great impact on costs and delays. This is related to the 
existing challenge of labor deficit (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 4) “The existing labor force is 
employed on a fly-in fly-out (FIFO) or drive-in-drive-out (DIDO) basis, working unequal “on” 
to “off”” (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 4). Leather and Wood (2012, p. 4) compare it to the 
“situation once faced in the Northern Alberta oil sands developments in Canada”. They comment 
that after completion of projects there will be demand only for small team of workers in the plant 
(Leather & Wood, 2012). They further state that “present CBM projects are more favorably 
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located: they will pipe gas from inland coal basins to LNG facilities near the town of Gladstone 
in Queensland, closer to Australia’s major east coast labor markets” (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 
5).  So they explain that “if each project is expected to employ some 5000-construction workers, 
a work force of some 15000 to 20000 will be needed to construct the projects and Gladstone for 
instance has population of only 50000” (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 5). Australian projects 
promise to bring a lot of benefits such as creating new jobs (Leather & Wood, 2012). But how 
they will manage this labor deficit?  
 
Table 4.1 Australian LNG projects (EIA, 2013a) 
Liquefaction 
terminal 
Equity partners Status/online date Capacity 
(Bcf/y) 
Consumer 
markets 
Capital 
cost 
Existing facilities  
Northwest 
Shelf LNG 
Woodside, Shell, 
BHP Biliton, BP, 
Chevron, 
Mitsubishi&Mitsui 
– 16.7% each 
Existing 780; 5 
trains 
Japan, China 
spot market 
$11.5 
billion 
for T1-3; 
$3.5 
billion 
for T4; 
$6.5 
billion 
for T5 
Darwin 
LNG 
ConocoPhillips 
57.2%, Santos 
11.4%, Inpex 
11.3%, Eni 11%, 
Tepco 6%, Tokyo 
Gas 3% 
Existing 170; 1 
train 
Japan and 
spot market 
$3.84 
billion 
Pluto LNG Woodside 90%, 
Kansai Electric 
5%, Tokyo Gas 
5% 
Existing/Expansion 
plans are being 
discussed 
205; 1 
train 
Japan, 
Malaysia 
$15 
billion 
Planned LNG projects using traditional gas 
Gorgon 
LNG 
Chevron, 47.33%, 
ExxonMobil 25%, 
Under 
construction; Q1 
720; 3 
trains 
Long-term 
contracts 
$52 
billion 
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Shell 25%, 
Japanese 
gas&electric 
utilities 2.667% 
2015; T4 planned 
with construction 
to begin in 2014 
with Japan, 
Korea, 
China, India, 
Mexico.Spot 
market 
Ichthys 
LNG 
INPEX 66.07%, 
Total 30%, 
Japanese gas & 
electric utilities 
2.74% 
Under 
construction; 2017 
400; 2 
trains 
Japan, 
Taiwan 
$34 
billion 
Wheatstone 
LNG 
Chevron 64.14%, 
Apache 13%, 
KUFPEC 
(Kuwait) 7% 
, Shell 6.4%, 
Japanese gas & 
electric utilities 
9.455% 
Under 
construction; 2016 
430; 2 
trains 
Japanese 
utilities 
$29 
billion 
Prelude 
LNG 
Shell 67.5%, Inpex 
17.5%, Kogas 
10%, CPC 5% 
Under 
construction; 2017 
175; 1 
floating 
terminal 2 
Japan and 
Asian 
markets 
$11.4 
billion 
Cash Maple 
LNG 
PTTEP (Thailand) 
100% 
2017 100; 1 
floating 
terminal 
Potentially 
Thailand 
N/A 
Browse 
LNG 
Woodside 31.23%, 
Shell 26.63%, BP 
17.21%, 
PetroChina 
10.23%, Mitsui 
7.35%, Mitsubishi 
7.35% 
2020; Cancelled 
financial 
investment 
decision (FID) for 
onshore facility in 
2013, potential 
floating terminal 
proposed 
576; 3 
trains 
Japan, 
Taiwan, 
other Asia 
$48 
billion 
Bonaparte 
LNG 
GDF Suez 60%, 
Santos 40% 
2018; FID 
expected 2014 
100-150; 
1 floating 
N/A $8 
billion 
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terminal 
Scarborough 
LNG 
BHP Billiton 50%, 
ExxonMobil 50% 
(operator) 
2020/21; FID 
anticipated 
2014/15 
300; 1 
floating 
terminal  
N/A N/A 
Sunrise 
LNG(Joint 
development 
Area-
Australia 
and Timor-
Leste) 
Woodside 33.44%, 
ConocoPhillips 
30%, Shell 
26.56%, Osaka 
Gas 10% 
2017 525; 1 
floating 
terminal 
N/A $5 
billion 
Planned CBM to LNG projects 
Queensland 
Curtis LNG 
T1: BG 50%, 
CNOOC 50%; T2: 
BG 97.5%, Tokyo 
Gas 2.5% 
Under 
construction; 2014 
400; 2 
trains 
Chile, 
Singapore, 
China, India 
$20.4 
billion 
Australia 
Pacific LNG 
Origin Energy 
37.5%, 
ConocoPhillips 
37.5%, Sinopec 
25% 
Under 
construction; mid-
2015; Proposed 
expansion 
430; 2 
trains 
China and 
Japan 
(Kansai 
Electric) 
$25.3 
billion 
Gladstone 
LNG 
Santos 30%, 
Petronas 27.5%, 
Total 27.5%, 
Kogas 15% 
Under 
construction; 2015 
375; 2 
trains 
Malaysia 
and Korea 
$18.5 
billion 
Fisherman’s 
Landing 
LNG Ltd 81.11%, 
CNPC subsidiary 
19.89% 
2016; FID 
expected 2H2013 
144; 2 
trains 
Potentially 
CNPC 
$1.1 
billion 
Arrow LNG Shell 50%, 
PetroChina 50% 
2018; EIS plan 
submitted; FID 
expected end-2013 
384; 2 
trains in 
Phase 1 
China $24.2 
billion 
Note: prices reflected at the above table are in US$. 
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This table shows existing LNG facilities and planned projects.  As we see from the table above 
there are 3existing facilities, 9 planned projects using traditional gas and 5 CBM to LNG 
projects. The target market is mainly oriented towards Asia.  Two of the existing facilities 
NWSV and Pluto will be used for further comparison with Gorgon, Wheatstone and Browse 
projects (selected for studies). 
 
The project participants in the existing facilities are mainly Australian, Japanese and Korean. But 
we see that number of planned projects increased with the involvement of international 
companies. This difference shows that role of Australian LNG in the Asia Pacific region is 
growing. Despite being very attractive destination for investments Australia has number of 
challenges as well (Ellis, et al., 2013). These challenges will be discussed in other parts as 
internal and external factors, together with “Fukushima effect”. If we look at start dates we can 
see that they range from 2014 to 2020. Many projects, many companies operating in one country 
with one target market with deadlines oriented towards 2020. This is related to increased demand 
in Asia Pacific region. “Increase in demand is related to various factors: population growth by 
500 million, increase in real per capita by 90%, decrease in coal use, increased fuel mix with 
natural gas” (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, pp. 8-9). This is creating competition for projects inside the 
country, in the target market and as we will see further companies also compete with each other 
within same projects and market. It looks like 2020 is a “common deadline” for all projects.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Australia’s LNG exports 
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This chart shows that majority of Australia’s LNG exports go to Japan. That is why “Fukushima 
Effect” and Japanese customers will be discussed later in order to show the importance of 
particular country.  
 
Australian LNG projects are experiencing cost overruns. “Increased costs are related to different 
factors: labor shortages and high wages, appreciation of the Australian dollar to the U.S. dollar 
since 2009, greater environmental hurdles due to more strict regulations recently, remote 
locations of some projects” (EIA, 2013a). “The costs of the projects exceeds at different levels”. 
According to EIA report (2013a), “cost overruns between 12 and 32 % are faced within 
following projects: Ichthys, Gorgon, Wheatstone, Gladstone, and Queensland Curtis”. “Pluto 
LNG experienced 30% cost overrun in 2007 and Gorgon project increased its cost about 40% 
from US$37 billion to US$52 billion” (EIA, 2013a).  
 
“Current LNG boom is causing high labor demand and companies have deficit of well trained 
workers” (Ellis, et al., 2013). Thus there might be need to hire workers from abroad (Ellis, et al., 
2013).  
 
This situation is very critical for Australia and is causing a lot of uncertainties for the future 
(Ellis, et al., 2013). This might influence shareholders willingness to invest further (Ellis, et al., 
2013). But it seems that unexpected costs are not influencing decisions of some. Thus, Japanese 
companies show their interest in projects (Lee, 2014). The reasons and motives for such decision 
will be discussed further. 
 
4.1.1 “Asian LNG market” 
 
It is important to mention that “there is no such thing as an “Asian” market” (Bradshaw, et al., 
2013, p. 9). Thus, “in countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and Pakistan gas is dominant; in 
China, India, the Philippines and Myanmar gas is marginal (providing less than 10% of total 
energy); in Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, gas market up to 
10-20% of total energy” (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, pp. 9,10). LNG imports are important for Asia 
because gas in this region is traded mostly via LNG (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, pp. 9-11). “Asian 
consumers are the largest in the world, thus, their imports were at least 60% of the world’s 
available LNG in each year since 1980” (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, p. 11). “LNG has provided one 
third of the total gas demand in Asia since 2000 and expected to increase to 38% by 2020” 
(Bradshaw, et al., 2013, p. 11).  
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“After LNG imports from Australia and Qatar have started in 1989 and 1997 the region sources 
only 29% of its LNG within Asian” (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, p. 11). “It is expected that by 2017 
Australia will largest supplier for Asia surpassing Qatar (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, pp. 12-13).  
Thus, Tsafos (2013, p. 12) suggests that “Asian consumers will benefit from Australia’s growth: 
Japan committed to buy 32 million tons per annum, China has contracted 18mmtpa; and 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and India will purchase smaller amounts of LNG from Australia”. “But there 
is downside of this situation, as increased interest of investors in Australia had spurred 
competition for resources, thus making prices of future LNG higher by 12% to 30%” (Bradshaw, 
et al., 2013, p. 13). Tsafos (2013, p. 13)emphasizes that: “Asian companies which invested in 
these LNG projects, will need to commit more capital into these projects to secure supply and 
higher prices to “justify their investments”. 
 
  
4.1.2 Problems faced by Pluto and Browse LNG projects 
 
Pluto project  
 
On July 2007 the project got approval for the development (Woodside, 2007). “Till the date of 
approval it is been approximately US$ 701,929 million (A$796 million as of 27.07.2007) spent 
on all phases of Pluto field and LNG project” (Woodside, 2007). “The additional funding of US$ 
9,87 billion (A$11.2 billion as of 27.07.2007) was also approved by Board for project on a 100% 
basis” (Woodside, 2007). There was “LNG Sale and Purchase agreements signed with Tokyo 
Gas and Kansai Electric of Japan” and it was stated by Woodside (2007) that it will provide 
“commercial certainty, ensuring a competitive rate of return for the foundation project without 
any regard to future expansions”. The Board gave approval for further studies on an expansion of 
LNG (Woodside, 2007). Environmental approvals from State and Commonwealth were received 
(Woodside, 2007). According to the agreement signed with Japanese companies “it was expected 
to have sales up to 3.75 mtpa for 15 years” (Woodside, 2007). As a result of Board approval 
there was “formation of a joint venture with Tokyo Gas and Kansai Electric resulting in 5% 
share for each of the companies and leaving Woodside with remaining 90% of the share” 
(Woodside, 2007). The project was expected to be funded through free cash flow from its 
Australian operations (Woodside, 2007).   
 
Now let us see how they were planning the pace for the project: 
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Figure 4.3 Timeline of Pluto project (Woodside, 2014) 
 
What happened next? 
Here is some information about issues related to project in chronological order 
Table 4.2 Issues faced by Pluto project 
Date Situation 
30.11.2010 “The project cost increased by US$ 867,114 million (A$900 million as of 
30.11.2010) and six more month extension before production. Increase in cost 
from estimated US$ 12,62 billion (A$13.1 billion) to US$ 13,49 billion (A$14 
billion). Reason: rebuild of several flare towers used to burn off waste gas, because 
they don’t meet design requirements due to the “wind issue”. Manager: Don 
Voelte” (AAP, 2010)  
17.06.2011 “First shipments are scheduled for March 2012, costs are rising by US$ 948,88 
million (A$900 million as of 17.06.2011) making it US$ 15,71 billion (A$14.9 
billion). Reason: design fault and weather-related issues. 
Manager: new CEO Peter Coleman. 
Remark: some analysts state that despite delays this project is relatively fast and 
aggressive for industry standards” (Bendeich & Kebede, 2011)  
25.09.2012 “New CEO of Woodside Peter Coleman lists the recent problems in LNG industry: 
the “plethora of LNG projects” in Pilbara and Queensland are making high-cost 
situation worse. He calls it “inertia” for required fall in costs. He lists projects: 
Gorgon, Wheatstone and some in Queensland.  He criticizes Chevron, Inpex and 
Santos for being “not enough experienced” which is also reason for delays and 
high-costs. Moreover he emphasized that margin between project cost and LNG 
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price is really thin. Most of the project participants according to him lack previous 
experience in LNG. Pluto is completed in 2012, 1.5 years late and 25% over 
budget” (Klinger, 2012) 
 
New CEO of Woodside Peter Coleman is listing the challenges in Australian LNG industry 
stating that it is concentration of projects in Western Australia which is causing competition 
(Klinger, 2012). “The reason for that is lack of experience of some projects participants, the 
timeline of projects that goes in approximately in parallel which is increasing already existing 
labor shortages and wages issues” (Klinger, 2012). He emphasized that this situation inside the 
country has more negative effect on costs than external factors (Klinger, 2012). He also 
mentioned that him “being Australian-based can see some challenges that are overlooked by 
other project managers who are concerned more about portfolio” (Klinger, 2012). Weather issues 
are also unpredictable and difficult to calculate (Klinger, 2012). 
 
Browse project 
 
This project had experienced difficulties related to delays and over costs. “Aboriginal population 
issues occurred during planning of Browse LNG project” (Leather & Wood, 2012). On 12 April 
2013 the company CEO and Managing Director Peter Coleman gave interview about project 
delays and over costs (Woodside, 2013a). 
Information about project issues: 
Table 4.3 Issues faced by Browse project 
Date Situation 
12.04.2013 “Cost escalation of Browse project making the current development concept not 
commercial. Coleman (Woodside, 2013a) said: “Woodside does not discuss 
publicly the capital costs or the commercial terms used to evaluate the project, nor 
do we publicly discuss the hurdle rates of investment returns which would likely 
differ for each joint venture participant”. He states that issues are not related to 
environment or red tape, but purely commercial.  
According to him US shale does not have impact on decision to delay and they 
have learned lessons from Pluto project: front-end planning activities such as the 
quality and cost assurance. 
He said that they are looking for alternative solutions” (Woodside, 2013a) 
30.04.2013 “Accepting Shell’s Floating LNG (FLNG) technology. This will bring 
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development to the project and build relationship with Shell” (Woodside, 2013a) 
 
Coleman was listing concentration of projects in one area within approximately same timeline as 
factor influencing project costs and making labor and wage issues worse (Klinger, 2012). These 
factors are critical for cots but cannot be easily estimated.  
 
4.1.3 Problems faced by Gorgon and Wheatstone LNG projects 
 
Gorgon project 
 
“The project got approval in 14 September 2009 as a joint venture. It is the largest resources 
project in Australia. The same year Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that 
Gorgon signed contract to export LNG to Japan and Korea” (Chevron, 2009). “The project 
participants initially were Chevron 50%, ExxonMobil and Shell 25% each” (Sapienza, 2009). 
“The project received all necessary approvals from state authorities and environmental 
conditions were planned to be met” (Chevron, 2009).  
Issues faced by the project: 
Table 4.4 Issues faced by Gorgon project 
Date Situation 
06.12.2012 “40% cost blowout puts a question on further expansion plans. Increase in cost 
from $US 43 billion to $US 52 billion. Reasons: strong Australian dollar (caused 
$US 5 billion increase in this cost), poor productivity at the remote Barrow Island 
site off WA, labor costs and weather. 
Project received criticism from ExxonMobil and Shell, calling it “over-ambitious 
target”” (Macdonald-Smith, 2012) . 
12.03.2014 “The cost raised from $US 52 to $US 54. Start-up date pushed to mid- 2015 
instead of first quarter. But, Chevron says that it is 80% complete and 2/3 of gas 
contracts signed” (AAP, 2014). 
 
 
“According to sources from Australian Mine and Metals Association the reason for that is high 
wages. While the Maritime Union claims that multiple levels of bureaucracy and 
mismanagement by Chevron are the reasons for that” (Diss & Lannin, 2013). Some estimates 
made in 2012 about future costs of the projects from the article by Angela Macdonald –Smith 
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(2012): the figure shows “the cost competitiveness of Australian projects when cost of Gorgon 
LNG raised from $US 43 to $US 52”. The projects seem to compete with each other thought 
they do supply for one market. “Australian dollar started highly increase since early 2000s, the 
exact effect of this factor was not predictable before final investment decision” (Macdonald-
Smith, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Costs of LNG projects: (Macdonald-Smith, 2012) 
If this is effect of Gorgon project cost overrun we can assume that there is certain “synergy” in 
cost increase within remaining projects. As CEO of Woodside Peter Coleman stated in his 
interview “the concentration of projects are increasing costs for all of them making labor and 
issues worse. In addition their timeline almost coincides so this is another issue” (Klinger, 2012).  
 
Wheatstone project 
 
“This project is one of the largest LNG projects of Australia. The final investment decision was 
received in 2011 and the project participants : Chevron 64.14%, apache 13%, Kuwait Foreign 
Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC) 7%, Shell 6.4% and Kyushu Electric power 
Company 1.46%, together with PE Wheatstone Pty Ltd (part owned by TEPCO 8%)” (Chevron, 
2014b).  
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“Australia’s federal government attached more than 70 conditions to the approval of Wheatstone 
project to limit the impact on the environment in the area” (Leather & Wood, 2012, p. 13).  
Table 4.5 Issues faced by Wheatstone project 
Date Situation 
20.01.2014 “Shell plans to exit Wheatstone LNG after selling its interest for 
US$ 1.14 billion to Kuwait Foreign Exploration Petroleum Co. 
According to the statement Shell is still interested in Australian 
investments but, further is planning to “concentrate investment 
away from the Chevron Corp (CVX)”” (Kennedy & Gismatullin, 
2014) 
 
According to information we can know that Shell is still interested in investing to Australia 
despite its challenges (Kennedy & Gismatullin). Approximate cost overrun for this project is 
between 12-32% (EIA, 2013a). As of March 2014 the project is 30% complete and scheduled to 
start in 2016 (AAP, 2014). 
 
Conclusion based on project issues: from the information above we can see that the reasons 
influencing high costs were known: labor shortages, high wages, and strong currency. But 
unfortunately the extend of influence of these factors cannot be estimated exactly. The projects 
started their implementations almost at the same time with same approximately same start date. 
These factors made existing challenges more difficult (costs increased and dates shifted).  
 
 
4.1.4 Initial planning for projects 
 
Pluto Project 
The table below shows the chronological order of the events and decisions during planning 
process prior to final investment decision. The information provided in the table is based on the 
data available in the official website of Australia’s oil and gas company Woodside. 
Table 4.6 Initial planning for Pluto project (Woodside, 2006) 
2003 December Pluto project receives permit 
2005 Pluto 100% owned by Woodside 
2005 April Initial discovery of Pluto field 
2005 July Completion of first appraisal well 
45 
 
2005 August Announcement of LNG project based on Pluto field. Development 
was granted Major Project Facilitation Status by the Australian 
government. Land was reserved by Western Australian government. 
2005 fourth quarter Key commercial terms had been agreed with North Asian customers 
for the delivery of 3.5 to 4 million tonnes of LNG a year. 
2005 December  Agreement between Woodside and Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd. For the 
supply of 1.5 to 1.75 million tones of LNG a year. 
For 2006 There were plans to make final site selection 
2006 December Approval of US$ 1,47 billion (A$1.4 billion) for Pluto site 
preparation by the Board. 
2006 The basis for design for facilities completed, FEED commenced 
(front end engineering design). 
2006 Three wells drilled to enable resource estimate, it was increased from 
3.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas to 4.1 Tcf. 
2007  Final investment decision 
 
I would like to further describe activities conducted by Woodside in order to better understand 
the situation during decision making process. “Woodside in 2006 as an operator of North West 
Shelf Venture delivered first cargo to the Southern China” (Woodside, 2006, p. 2). “Same year 
NWSV Phase 5 project was scheduled on a schedule for 2008 and the Board approved 1.4 billion 
dollars for Pluto” (Woodside, 2006, p. 2). In this report it was written “we seek to improve 
efficiency and minimize lead times through for example, standardization of engineering 
specifications and equipment” (Woodside, 2006, p. 5). They also stated “despite the industry’s 
cost and schedule pressures we are committed to delivering our projects on track” (Woodside, 
2006, p. 5).  They believed that they “made great progress in the projects and confident that they 
matured Pluto sufficiently to make final investment decision” (Woodside, 2006, p. 5). 
Woodside was studying demand in Asia Pacific region. They knew that “Asian buyers need to 
secure their supply side outside their region” (Woodside, 2006, p.7). So for Pluto project, the 
company selected “reliable customers with proven track records in order to have smooth demand 
profile” (Woodside, 2006, p. 7).  
Woodside is experienced company and “in 2006 despite delivered cargoes (NWS project) faced 
uncertain problems” (Woodside, 2006). According to their report of 2006 “ five tropical 
cyclones, record high temperatures in Karratha, typhoon activity in Japan and technical issues at 
the Karratha plant made 2006 challenging year” (Woodside, 2006, p. 6). “Same year NWSV 
signed agreements with Chugoku Electric, Toho Gas, Chuib Electric, Kansai Electric, Tokyo 
Gas, Tokyo Electric and Osaka Gas for future LNG deliveries of about 40 million tonnes after 
2009” (Woodside, 2006).   Woodside had plans to “construct a Burrup LNG Park to provide 
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capital efficiencies for all gas owners in the area and achieve early commercialization of 
resources” (Woodside, 2006, p. 12). 
In order to “manage costs the company decided to use benchmarks of the NWS Phase 5 
expansion project” (Woodside, 2006, p. 12). They decided to use “schedule synergies” between 
Pluto and Phase 5 to have transition of management, labor, suppliers and contractors (Woodside, 
2006, p. 12). They expected to contribute $17 billion to Australia’s economy according to 
financial forecasts.  Further they write in report: “we expect to be in a position to make a final 
investment decision in mid - 2007 to enable delivery of first LNG to Tokyo Gas and Kansai 
Electric by late 2010” (Woodside, 2006, p. 12). 
In 2006 the company decided to “incorporate Xena field into the Pluto LNG. This is because 
field has 0.4 trillion cubic feet of dry gas” (Woodside, 2006, p. 12). 
 “The final investment decision on Pluto project was taken in July 2007 and was the most 
significant achievement for the company for the given year” (Woodside, 2007, p. 2). According 
to the company’s report of 2007: “Pluto is one of the only three LNG projects to receive 
approval worldwide over the last three years and is the fastest ever from discovery to FID” 
(Woodside, 2007, p. 2).  
In the “capital management strategy” part of the report, they wrote: “During 2007, Woodside’s 
capital investment grew, as spending on the newly approved Pluto project ramped up” 
(Woodside, 2007, p. 8). Moreover “it was expected to increase expenditure to US$ 3,94 billion 
“(A$5 billion) and as stated in the report “most of these capital was going to be spent for Pluto 
project in order to progress it and make sure to deliver first gas by the end of 2010” (Woodside, 
2007, p. 8). 
“This same year was good for the company in terms of long-term contracting. Thus, Tokyo Gas 
and Kansai Electric Power Company Inc. became partners of Woodside in the Pluto field” 
(Woodside, 2007, p. 10). As stated in the report “these deals underpinned the US$ 8,83 billion 
(A$11.2 billion dollar) final investment decision for the Pluto”  (Woodside, 2007, p. 10).  
“As for LNG shipments, it was expected that customers and joint ventures of the Woodside 
company Tokyo Gas and Kansai Electric will each supply one ship” (Woodside, 2007, p. 11). 
“From technological point, Pluto was expected to be similar to Angel project (NWSV) and 
“incorporate 25 years of experience” of Woodside”  (Woodside, 2007, p. 16). 
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As “Woodside is a pioneer in a modular design for LNG trains, it applied this design for Pluto 
project’ (Woodside, 2007, p. 17). 
“According to Board sanctioned assumptions the Pluto project generates an internal rate of return 
of 10-15%” (Woodside, 2007, p. 24). 
“In order to meet schedule requirements Woodside was focusing on hiring right people and 
contractors with world class expertise” (Woodside, 2007, p. 24). Report states the following: 
“technical specialists and trades people involved in the construction of the NWS train 5 project 
have progressively moved to the Pluto construction project, supporting the business objectives of 
both projects” (Woodside, 2007, p. 25). “All operations resources were supposed to be provided 
from Woodside existing technician training capabilities” (Woodside, 2007, p. 25). 
If “in 2006 the Board approved US$ 1,02 billion (A$1.4 billion) for Pluto, by the time the final 
investment decision was made the whole sum was already committed. By the end of 2007 this 
number increased to US$ 3,94 billion (A$5 billion)” (Woodside, 2007, p. 25).  “For managing 
schedule uncertainties and costs Woodside was securing vital equipment and services in 
advance” (Woodside, 2007, p. 25). “At the same time the feasibility studies for Train 2 were 
underway. There are a lot of undeveloped gas discoveries in the area so the Pluto project was 
initially designed for expansion” (Woodside, 2007, p. 25). 
 
Figure 4.5 Pluto planned timeline (Woodside, 2007, p.25) 
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From the timeline above we can see two dates: approval and first gas delivery. It looks like 
Woodside was aware of possible challenges: industry costs, weather conditions, pressure related 
to the contracts and labor issues. They decided to use their previous experience and relied on 
benchmarking of NWS phase 5. Moreover, they decided to transfer technicians from NWS phase 
5 and use “schedule synergy”.  
Conclusion: based on information we can assume that possible reasons for costs and delays 
were linked to the critical success factors known by the company: high industry and labor costs, 
weather conditions. They signed contracts with customers before final investment decision and 
were committed to deliver first cargoes in 2010. But despite their commitment most of the 
critical factors change over time and it is difficult to estimate their exact impact on project costs 
and start dates.  
 
Browse project 
Information about planning process for this project is provided in the table below based on data 
provided by Woodside. 
Table 4.7 Initial planning for Browse project (Woodside, 2006-2013) 
2006 Appraisal of fields: Torosa-5, Torosa-6, Callaince-3 
2007 Evaluation of sites, proposing three options for project development 
2008 Appraisal of fields:Torosa-5, Torosa-6, Callaince-3(the work continued) 
2008 Woodside and joint venture participants to decide which option to choose: 
onshore liquefaction in Kimberley or piping gas to existing facilities at Karratha 
2010 Choosing Kimberley option as preferred location (James Price Point, Western 
Australia). Selection was made anonymously by joint venture participants 
2011 Environmental approvals are expected, the native title agreement signed 
2012 April Variations to the Browse Basin retention leases were approved, which included 
extending the timetable for readiness for a FID to the 1H 2013.FEED studies 
completed. 
2012 Woodside sold a minority of its equity in Browse LNG Development to Japan 
Australia LNG (MIMI Browse) Pty LTD.  
Chevron sold its equity share to Shell development in Australia and BHP Billiton 
announced about intentions to sell its equity to PetroChina 
2012 July Western Australian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) recommended 
conditional approval of the State Government’s proposed LNG precinct. The 
Precinct requires approval from the Commonwealth Environment Minister, 
which was expected in 1H 2013. 
2012 
December  
The EPA and WA Environment Minister approved Woodside’s proposal to build 
LNG processing facility in the Precinct. The public review of Environmental 
Impact Statement for the project was completed and final information was 
expected to be approved in Q1 2013 
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2013 April Woodside announced that James Price Point development concept did not meet 
the company’s commercial requirements for FID (final investment decision) 
2013 
September 2 
Selection of new concept: FLNG (Shell) 
 
“In 2013 the expected final investment decision was postponed because the initial concept for 
project development was not approved. The final investment decision for Browse LNG project is 
expected to be taken in 2015” (Woodside, 2013, p. 17). 
“In 2006 Woodside was working on understanding the potential of the fields. Afterwards there 
were three drillings to confirm field boundaries” (Woodside, 2006, p. 14). 
 
4.6 Timeline of Browse project (Woodside 2006, p.15) 
“During 2007 Woodside evaluated several sites where potentially LNG facilities could be built, 
the result showed that each option has its advantages and challenges” (Woodside, 2007, p. 26).   
“Woodside compared three options: offshore, onshore and “Browse to Borrop”. Testing so called 
“offshore option” showed that developing liquefaction facilities in the lagoonal waters is the 
lowest cost option and highest economic value. But the company was aware that this 
environmentally sensitive area could cause some hesitations among stakeholders” (Woodside, 
2007, p. 26).  
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“Testing for the “onshore option” showed that it is possible to locate liquefaction facilities in the 
Kimberley and Darwin areas, thus preventing issues by minimizing environmental impact” 
(Woodside, 2007, p. 26). 
““Browse to Borrop” option was about building pipeline of approximately 1,000 km and 
compression platform in order to transport gas to Karratha. But it would add more cost, technical 
challenges and alignment of different joint ventures” (Woodside, 2007, p. 26).  
Report of 2007 underlined that “Woodside was developing offshore and onshore options in 
parallel” (Woodside, 2007, p. 26). 
“Same year Woodside signed agreements with PetroChina Company Ltd and CPC Corporation, 
Taiwan for future supplies starting from 2013-2015 for 15-20 years period and 2-3 million 
tonnes of LNG each” (Woodside, 2007, p. 26) .  
 
Figure 4.7 Browse project: new timeline (Woodside, 2007, p.27) 
Conclusion: in 2007 the company was evaluating three possible options and same year they 
signed agreement for future supplies with customers. In 2008 through anonymous voting the 
company decided to choose. In 2013 the company decided to change the concept before final 
investment decision. CEO of the company Peter Coleman stated that the reason is commercial 
though cannot be discussed openly. We can assume that “Kimberley option” was selected due to 
the following reasons: 1. Supply agreement added some pressure on decision in order to deliver 
first cargoes in 2013-2015.; 2. “Kimberley option” was perhaps viable in 2008, but uncertainty 
increases over time and prices also (labor costs, currency appreciation). Indeed it was good for 
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the project that they decided to shift the date for final investment decision. This time of 
approximately less than half year gave them chance to find new FLNG option as a better 
alternative. They benefited from the “rework” through “learning loops”. “Rework” should not be 
seen as unexpected negative event but rather tool to correct the situation (Pinto, 2013).   
 
Gorgon and Wheatstone projects  
Gorgon project 
The project got approved in 2009 (Chevron, 2009). Since Chevron has 47.33% shares in the 
project and acts as operator I would like to describe the planning process from Chevron 
perspective. Further I will try to reflect how ExxonMobil and Shell participated in the decision 
making process.  
Table 4.8 Gorgon project timeline: Chevron perspective (Frontier, 2009, p.14) 
Date Action 
1973 West Tryal Rocks Field discovered 
1976 Spar field discovered 
1984 Gorgon field discovered 
1994 Chrysoar field discovered 
1996 Dionysus field discovered 
1998 Reserves certified and Gorgon JVPs undertake Front End Engineering and Design 
(FEED) work (8mtpa Burrup) 
Asian economic crisis puts a hold on project 
1999 Io, Jansz and Geryon fields discovered 
2001 Chevron promotes standalone Barrow Island plant location 
2003 Environmental, Social and Economic Assessment process completed 
Barrow Island Act 2003 passed; WA Government approves 300 hectares for 
development 
2005 FEED commences for 2X5 mtpa with supply from Gorgon and Io/Jansz 
Framework Agreement Signed 
2006 Chandon and Clio fields discovered 
2007 Environmental approvals for 2X5 mtpa granted; 3X5 mtpa scheme agreed by JVPs 
2008  Public Environmental Review starts on revised and expanded scope 
Successful on-ground test of prototype drilling rig for CO2 injection Project 
2009 WA Environmental Protection Authority approves revised and expanded 3X5 mtpa 
scope 
Gorgon Downstream FEED completed 
Arrival of Ensco 7500 rig starts one of the largest drilling programs in Australia 
Expressions of Interest for domestic gas 
State and Federal Government environmental approvals completed 
Production Licenses offered 
Gorgon Project Final Investment Decision (FID) by JVPs 
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According to the information provided by Chevron Australia: “project start up and first gas is 
planned for mid-2015. Domestic gas is due to be delivered to the market in 2015. The Gorgon 
Joint Venture Participants are progressing environmental approvals for expansion of the Project” 
(Chevron, 2014b).  
While looking at the information from the 2009 we see that “project cost is estimated to be US$ 
29,78 billion (A$43 billion) for the first phase development” (Chevron, 2014b). It says further 
that “it is expected to be operational in 2014” (Chevron, 2009, p. 9).   
In 2009 Chris Oliver, Upstream Engineering manager has offered some innovative solutions for 
Gorgon project (Chevron, 2009b, p. 18) . This solution was “to build the Jansz Northern Route 
(direction of the subsea pipeline)” (Chevron, 2009, p.18). According to Chevron (2009b): “a 
project team recommended this solution” and Oliver (Chevron, 2009b) says further that: 
“importantly, all risk associated with the Northern Route were deemed acceptable, in line with 
Chevron’s risk assessment criteria”. Further Chris Oliver (Chevron, 2009b) tells about “Finding 
a Creative, Doable Solution: he mentioned that at the beginning the project team selected 
southern route and that it required “adding a number of specialist to the team –including 
members from the Gorgon JVP ExxonMobil partnership and from University of Western 
Australia”. But finally, “after evaluating alternative option of Jansz northern route the team 
decided to choose it as a demonstration of the critical link between quality decision-making and 
sound capital stewardship” (Chevron, 2009b, p. 20).  
Managing Director of Chevron Australia Roy Krzywosinski (Chevron, 2009b, p. 9) stated that: 
“Having right people with the appropriate skills, commitment and “operator mindset” is essential 
and this is where Chevron’s corporate values and ongoing focus on safety, capital stewardship 
and operational excellence will be fundamental to our success”.  
 
Shell perspective 
From the media release of Shell dating to 14 September 2009 we see that “Shell announced a 
long-term agreement with PetroChina for LNG from its share in Gorgon” (Shell, 2009) . 
Interesting fact that “PetroChina signed same year contract with Qatargas and Shell to purchase 
3 million tonnes LNG per annum from Qatargas project in Qatar. The additional 3.3 million 
tonnes of LNG supplied to China from NWS project where Shell is also participant” (Xinhua 
news agency, 2008). 
53 
 
ExxonMobil perspective 
In the news release of ExxonMobil Australia stated that: “The decision follows recent execution 
of LNG sales and purchase agreements with PetroChina International Company Limited and 
Petronet LNG Limited of India for ExxonMobil’s equity share of LNG in the Gorgon Project” 
(ExxonMobil, 2009). 
Chevron Australia sees this approach as “innovative marketing approach” because the project 
participants sign agreements with customers (Chevron, 2014a). Thus Chevron Australia executed 
Sale and Purchase agreements with following companies: Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas, Chubu 
Electric Power, GS Caltex of South Korea, Nippon Oil Corporation and Kyushu Electric 
(Chevron, 2014a) . 
Conclusion: from the Chevron perspective it is seen that they received all necessary approvals 
and committed to create jobs. Probably the company was aware of existing challenges, but had to 
get its project approved in order to be benefit from rising demand in Asia-Pacific region. The 
issues of labor shortages and wages cannot be solved easily. Hiring people from abroad and 
training staff adds additional costs and shifts start date. Furthermore company had to sign 
agreements and set a certain start date which was another factor adding pressure on decision 
making process. “Chevron’s risk assessment criteria” is not quite clear and since the company is 
of American origin it is probably based on “American approach” of assessing risks. May be that 
is why the CEO of Woodside Peter Coleman was emphasizing that he is Australian-based and 
most of the companies do not see the real situation in Australian LNG industry. In addition 
concentration of companies in one area is increasing costs even more.  Can the project 
participants discuss strategic plan openly? Shell is European company and participates in other 
Australian LNG projects: NWS and Browse.  
 
Wheatstone project 
“A final investment decision for Wheatstone project was made in September 2011” (Chevron, 
2009c). According to information provided “before FID (final investment decision) was taken 
there were studies taken on environmental, site together with social and economic impacts” 
(Chevron, 2009c). 
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Table 4.9 Wheatstone project timeline (Chevron, 2014) 
August 2004 Chevron discovers the Wheatstone gas field 
March 2008 Chevron announces its intention to develop the wholly owned WA-17-R and 
WA-253-P petroleum titles as a greenfield onshore LNG and domestic gas 
project 
June 2008 Chevron identifies three potential sites for further investigation, based on a site 
screening study 
September 
2008 
Chevron begins the environmental approval process (based on three short-listed 
sites) 
December 
2008 
Chevron announces Ashburton North as the preferred site 
March 2009 Chevron begins engineering and environmental studies on the Ashburton North 
site 
May 2009 Chevron announces a two-train LNG development for the first phase 
July 2009 Chevron Australia awards Front End Engineering and Design (FEED) contract 
for Wheatstone LNG and domestic gas plant to Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals 
Inc. 
October 2009 Local subsidiaries of Apache Corporation and Kuwait Foreign Petroleum 
Exploration Company (KUFPEC) sign deals to join the project as natural gas 
suppliers and 25 percent equity participants 
December 
2009 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) sign a nom-binding Heads of 
Agreement (HOA) to take 4.1 MTPA of LNG, become a 15% owner of the 
Wheatstone gas resources and an 11.25% owner of the gas plant 
January 2010 Chevron signs a HOA with Kyushu Electric Power Company to acquire 1.83% 
of Chevron’s equity share in the Wheatstone field licenses and a 1.37% interest 
in the Wheatstone natural gas processing facilities, which includes taking 
delivery of 0.8 MTPA of LNG 
July 2010 Chevron signs a HOA with the Thalanyji People of Onslow, for land required 
to develop the Wheatstone Project. The Native Title agreement sets out 
significant benefits in terms of education, training, employment, business 
development and financial support 
July 2010 Chevron releases the draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS)/Environmental Review and Management Programme (ERMP) 
April 2011 Chevron signs an agreement with Shell Development (Australia) for an 8% 
participating interest in the Wheatstone and lago natural gas fields  and a 6.4% 
interest in the project facilities 
July 2011 Chevron signs a Sales and Purchase Agreement (SPA) with TEPCO for the 
delivery of 3.1 MTPA of LNG for a period of up to 20 years 
August 2011 Chevron welcomes the Western Australian Government Environmental 
Approval for the Wheatstone Project 
September 
2011 
Chevron sings SPA with Kyushu to deliver 0.7MTPA of LNG for a period of 
up to 20 years 
September 
2011 
Chevron welcomes Australian Commonwealth Government Environmental 
Approval for its Wheatstone Project 
September 
2011 
Chevron announces the Final Investment Decision for the Wheatstone Project 
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Conclusion: the project is operated by the same company as Gorgon and the timeline between 
final investment decision in both projects is approximately with two years difference. We can 
assume that the factors influencing the project’s outcome are similar. Moreover this project is 
also located in Western Australia where there is high concentration of projects. The costs were 
unavoidable.  
 
4.1.5 The NWSV comparison 
 
While studying reports on described projects provided by Chevron Australia, I decided that one 
more project deserves attention in this paper. The reason for choosing this project is that it is 
located in Australia and it will help to analyze initial planning and possible reasons that caused 
“unexpected costs and delays”. I refer to analysis through the prism of “seven deadly sins” that 
managers tend to repeat found by Pinto (2013). In his article he analyzed his findings through 
comparison of the existing projects and the projects that were experiencing cost and delay issues.  
“The North West Shelf Venture project celebrated 25 years anniversary in 2009” (Chevron, 
2009b, p. 16). “This venture exports LNG for 20 years to Asia Pacific region” (Chevron, 2009b, 
p. 16). The other interesting thing about it that “joint venture participants are: Chevron, Shell, 
BP, BHP Billiton, Japan LNG Australia and Woodside Petroleum operator” (Chevron, 2009b, p. 
16). Woodside Company was using this project “as a benchmark in the Pluto project in order to 
manage costs” (Woodside, 2006). “The cost of the project represents investment of more than 
US$ 23, 74 billion (A$27 billion) and it accounts for more than 40% of Australia’s oil and gas 
production” (Woodside, 2014).  
“This project is pride of Australia and venture participants” (Chevron, 2009b, p. 16).  
In October 2009 ACIL Tasman published report named “Nation Builder” explaining “How the 
North Shelf Project has driven economic transformation in Australia”.  Apart of contributions 
and benefits that this project brought to Australia, report describes conclusions based on findings 
and some observations made through analysis of the project.  
“The NWSV was formed in 1963 and initially had three participants: Woodside, Shell and 
Burmah Oil. The project starts its history from 1970 when natural gas reserves were found in 
Carnavon Basin off the Pilbara Coast (North West Australia). First LNG train was built in 1989” 
(Begley, 2009, p. 5).  
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The most remarkable findings are related to the recommendations made for project costs. Begley 
(2009, p. 8) suggests that “there is certain cost escalation which occurs through the time. As 
example they consider that A$ 1 in 1990 would be equal to A$ 1.61 in 2008-09”. That is why he 
used “Australian Consumer Price Index to compare cost estimates made during initial planning 
with “real day” cost” (Begley, 2009, p. 8). “A single CPI cost escalator is used because it brings 
estimates into today’s terms-while reflecting the changing expenditure power of a dollar for 
consumers” (Begley, 2009, p. 8).  But Begley (2009, p. 8) warns that “the price we get after 
calculating it through CPI can underestimate the cost of facilities compare to the ones of today”.  
A figure below illustrates the cost difference between Australian CPI and recent estimates for the 
capital costs for the global upstream oil and gas industry recommended by Begley (2009,p.8). 
 
Figure 4.8 Cost escalation  and CPI (ACIL Tasman analysis 2009) 
“This gap is caused by the rise of upstream construction cost for oil and gas industry which 
became higher than CPI trends” (Begley, 2009, p. 8). 
So Begley (2009, p. 8) suggests that “the US$ 23,75 billion (A$27 billion) of construction 
expenditure on the NWSV oil and gas facilities would cost more than US$ 43,97 billion (A$50 
billion) if they were constructed in 2009”.  
Employment impacts of NWS project: report shows that “it is likely that the wages of specialized 
labor force were increased due to demand  and the number of workers was remaining small 
because they cannot expand quickly (due to the specialization)” (Begley, 2009, p. 20). 
“In 2004 Woodside signed a Joint Venture agreement for a five-year program with the WA 
Energy Research Alliance (WA:ERA) worth up to US$ 26,38 million (A$30 million)” (Begley, 
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2009, p. 41). “This research alliance is a collaboration between University of Western Australia, 
CSIRO and Curtin University of Technology. The goal of alliance is to share knowledge, skills 
and facilities for conducting research in oil and gas industry” (Begley, 2009, p. 41).  
“Clough is a Perth based provider that deserves attention. The work of “Clough” a Perth based 
provider of oil and gas services, front-end engineering design, construction, installation, 
commissioning to operation, asset support and maintenance services” (Begley, 2009, p. 42). 
“Clough had its first offshore oil and gas contract with the NWSV North Rankin A platform and 
now provides its project management and engineering services to the world” (Begley, 2009, p. 
42). This provider is “a member of a Kellogg Joint Venture and had worked for Pluto LNG and 
Chevron’ s Gorgon project” (Begley, 2009, p.42). “The NWSV had an impact on the economic 
structure of the Western Australian economy” (Begley, 2009, p. 42). Among the other 
advantages that this project brought are: “benefits of major technology investments arising 
through transfer of labor, from learning effects and from market development externalities” 
(Begley, 2009, p. 42). Moreover, Begley (2009, p. 42) in his report talks about “improvements in 
the productivity of local firms through knowledge externalities through labor transfer”. He 
explains that this happens for example, “when employees of the NWSV and its sub-contractors – 
who have gained new knowledge – transfer to a domestic firm” (Begley, 2009, p. 42). 
“Knowledge transfer can be achieved from foreigners who come from other countries or 
companies” (Begley, 2009, p. 43). In the example of NWSV there was “transfer of knowledge, 
personnel was trained and transferred between the organizations to provide services for NWSV” 
(Begley, 2009, p. 43). As for “technologies”, they were “provided by the international companies 
such as the Dutch organization SIPM, Kellogg Oversees Corporation, and Japan Gas 
Corporation” (Begley, 2009, p. 43).  
Conclusion: From the example of NWSV we learned that certain challenges were present in 
Australian LNG industry: labor shortages and wages, and cost escalation. Was it actually 
possible to estimate effect of these challenges correctly? Critical success factors might change 
over time and their influence changes as well. The project participants were cooperating and 
sharing knowledge. But external environment and demand in Asia Pacific were different at that 
period of time. Even if managers used this project as a benchmark for planning the other factors 
have changed which would influence decision. 
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Key empirical points after analyzing issues faced by projects and initial planning process 
(Pluto, Browse, Gorgon and Wheatstone): 
 Existing challenges such as labor shortages and high wages, strong Australian dollar and 
legislation peculiarities became more difficult to handle because of high concentration of 
the projects in the same area (Western Australia) 
 The demand side is “setting a deadline” to start receiving first cargoes by 2020 and 
spurring competition by signing multiple agreements 
 Cost escalation is unavoidable and cannot be estimated with exact accuracy 
 Knowing critical success factors is not enough they change over time and their effects on 
projects also changes over time 
 “Human factor” should not be considered as a source of bias during decision making 
process. The pressure of competition is influencing decision.  
 Example of NWSV shows how cooperation between project participants made it 
successful. But, the critical success factors at that time were different. Most probably 
participants’ expectations were met with project expectations. We do not know how 
project participants position themselves within project and what kind of expectations they 
have. We also do not know the key driving motives for their decision. 
 
4.2 Internal factors influencing success for Australian LNG projects 
 
“Australia has advantage due to the resources but has internal challenges that are influencing 
success of the projects. Among them are labor costs, legislation, red tape and green tape, policy 
and fiscal regimes” (APPEA, 2013). Further we will see how these factors affect LNG projects. 
 
4.2.1 “Australian situation” 
 
Australian government as well as major oil companies investing in project such as Gorgon had 
high expectations and hopes about the future. As outlined in one of the Chevron Australia Media 
statements made by Chairman of the Board and CEO Dave O’Reilly in 2008: “Australian 
government and industry is facing challenges related to Five Expectations” (O'Reilly, 2008) 
Among these “Five Expectations” or “5Es” Dave O’Reilly (2008) points that in order to be 
successful they should focus on: “energy, engineering advancements, the environment, 
economics and employment”.  
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“Energy expectations are important because Australia’s LNG exports are oriented towards Asia 
Pacific region” (O'Reilly, 2008). O’Reilly (2008) underlined importance of two projects of 
Chevron Corporation in Western Australia - Gorgon and Wheatstone. He explains that “both of 
them are expected to bring profits to Australia and according to the independent research group 
ACIL Tasman the government will earn around US$ 31,74 billion (A$40 billion of Australian’s 
dollars as of 17 September 2008) from the Gorgon project” (O'Reilly, 2008). This he explains 
“will increase Australia’s Gross Domestic Product of around US$ 50,78 billion (A$64 billion) 
net present value, and bring US$ 26,18 billion (A$33 billion) through consumption of local 
goods and services. Moreover they expected to create thousands of jobs” (O'Reilly, 2008). These 
projects are going to be long-term and Gorgon for example is expected to bring energy for the 
period of more than 40 years” (O'Reilly, 2008). 
 
The “second expectation” is related to the “success in the area of engineering or technology 
advancements” (O'Reilly, 2008). He underlies that “building offshore production platforms, 
pipeline systems, facilities to cool and condense natural gas into a liquid are the challenging 
tasks in the petroleum business. That is why Chevron has long-term partnerships with 
universities and supports research” (O'Reilly, 2008). O’Reilly (2008) was explaining the plans 
related to Gorgon for “building up one of the longest subsea tie backs in the world from the 
Jansz field, which is 180 km from the wellhead back to Barrow Island”. But he explains there is 
a “debatable issue related to plans of Australian Government: from one side it has aim to develop 
Australian LNG and sees it as a national competitive advantage. At the same time there is a 
regulation concerning emission trading scheme” (O'Reilly, 2008). He stated that “normally the 
LNG industry should be recognized and encouraged over more polluting energy industries” 
(O'Reilly, 2008). But in reality he mentioned that “proposed ETS is leaving the LNG industry 
bearing the full economic costs, and is essentially subsidizing more carbon intensive industries” 
(O'Reilly, 2008). He warned that it can influence “further growth of the LNG industry and 
increase global warming” (O'Reilly, 2008). 
 
O’Reilly (2008) brought to the table a question about finding a way “to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions without jeopardizing the future of Australia’s LNG industry” as a “third expectation”. 
 
The next “e” mentioned by O’Reilly (2008) was about “economics”, since “LNG is the most 
capital intensive industry”. He was warning about “uncertainty with return on investments” 
(O'Reilly, 2008). He suggested considering a “scenario proposed by Professor Ross Garnaut 
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using a hypothesized emissions price of US$ 15,86 (A$20) per ton over the life of a project” 
(O'Reilly, 2008). “This price could increase the operating costs of the projects Gorgon and 
Wheatstone operated by Chevron by US$ 79,35 to US$ 158,69 million ($100 to 200 million) 
each per year. This might be additional cost that could put the projects to difficult situation” 
(O'Reilly, 2008). 
 
The final “expectation” mentioned by O’Reilly (2008) was about “finding talents for the 
projects” in other words “labor power”. He mentioned that due to” increasing demand for skilled 
labor Australian government at all levels should work on certain policies helping the private 
sector to recruit the talent needed for specific roles” (O'Reilly, 2008). 
 
Conclusion and points made on internal factors:  
Wong (2007) argues that a project is successful when human expectations and project 
expectations are met. Australian projects are expected to be on-time and on-budget. Stakeholders 
are expecting to see return on investment and benefit from high demand for LNG in Asia-Pacific 
region. These five expectations are actually challenges for Australian projects because they 
influence costs and delays. These “challenges-expectations” had influence on planning and 
decision making process thus putting additional pressure on managers.  
 
4.3 External factors influencing success of the projects  
 
Planning for projects requires considering external factors or factors that do not depend on 
Australia. There are several rivals in the Asia Pacific region who are also eager to benefit from 
the growing demand in the area. The cost for LNG will depend on different factors such as 
“pricing mechanism which is different in Asia, USA and Europe” (BREE, 2013).  “Competition 
from USA can be caused by shale gas revolution which changed the position of the country from 
buyer to seller” (Bradshaw, et al., 2013, p. 53) . Moreover it is important to note that the “pricing 
mechanism in USA is linked to Henry Hub which can be more attractive for Asian buyers 
because it makes it three times cheaper than Asian” (Lee, 2013, p.4). “Asian prices are linked to 
oil prices on a Btu-equivalent basis, so oil at US$ 100 a barrel pulls Asia’s LNG to about US$ 15 
per million Btu” (Lee, 2013, p. 4).  “US LNG exports will depend on the Department of Energy 
approvals” (Lee, 2013, p. 4).  There is another competitor – “Qatar which is resource rich 
country with output capacity of 10 bcf a day and who is unwilling easily give up its customers” 
(Lee, 2013, p. 5). A senior analyst at the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan Hiroshi 
Hashimoto says that “Qatar’s marketers are gearing up campaigns to secure long-term deals in 
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the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, Malaysia and Thailand” (Lee, 2013, p. 5).  “The 
potential of this country should not be underestimated since it delivers nearly one sixth of global 
LNG supply and has market foothold in 75% of importing countries” (Lee, 2013, p. 5). Russia 
has ambitions for Asian market due to its political and economic plans for developing Far East 
(Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 2). “Gazprom for example may add a third train to Sakhalin-2 
project which is the first and only LNG plant for now” (Lee, 2013, p. 7). There are also ongoing 
“discussions between Russia and Japan for future project developments” (Lee, 2013, p. 8). As 
for the pricing Lee (2013, p. 8) comments that “Asian buyers are concerned about prices and 
according to the Development Bank of Japan estimates LNG import costs could fall by 7 to 15% 
by 2020 if buyers succeed in securing large quantities of LNG from the United States”.  Hiroshi 
Hashimoto from Institute of Energy Economics, Japan warns that “Japan has to take all proactive 
actions in order to avoid excessive and unexpected costs in LNG prices which can be changed 
later by suppliers” (Lee, 2013, p. 8). He proposed certain “solutions which include special deals 
with US LNG plant operators to buy it on Henry Hub prices, investing in projects to have shares, 
forming the Japanese buyer consortium and importing pipeline gas from Russia” (Lee, 2013, p. 
8).  
 
4.3.1 Major rivals in the APR 
 
North America 
“After announcement in October 2011 of the US LNG export deal between Cheniere Energy and 
BG Group and Cheniere’s agreements with Kogas, Gas Natural and GAIL US plans regarding 
exports to Asia Pacific Region have moved from theory into practice” (Henderson, 2012, p. 4). 
There are “two main motives driving this decision” according to Henderson (2012, p. 4): 
commercial and political. Commercial logic states Henderson (2012, p. 4) “was created due to 
the differing trajectories of the global gas markets over the past 5-10 years, in particular the 
contrast between the US domestic market and the gas market in the Asia-Pacific region”.  
 
Commercial logic for US LNG and gas export projects 
“The commercial logic was clear since 2012 when the gap between prices was so great that any 
gas exporting company could benefit from high margins” (Henderson, 2012, p. 4).  
 
Henderson (2012, p. 18) calls Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass terminal “as a good example of a 
project initially conceived as an import scheme that is now directing its facilities towards gas 
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exports”. “The project is planned to consist of 4 trains each with a nominal capacity of 4.5 mtpa 
for a total of 18 mtpa of LNG (21.6bcma, 2.1 Bcf/d), coming on-stream in stages from 2015 to 
2018” (Henderson, 2012, p. 18). 
 
Geopolitical implications 
 
Although LNG is traded globally, natural gas markets are separate (Cunningham, 2013). There is 
big difference between gas process in Asia and USA. For instance, “in 2012 gas spot prices in 
Asia reached US$ 15.63 mcf while in US they were only US$ 3.30” (Cunningham, 2013, p. 3). 
Cunningham (2013, p. 3) states that “these factors are allowing USA to export surplus taking 
advantage of price difference”.  
 
According to Cunningham (2013, p. 5) in this situation “USA sees opportunity as a form of 
support for its allies in Europe and Asia”.  As an argument he mentions “legislation in late 2012 
introduced by former Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) about LNG exports to NATO Allies aiming 
to boost energy security in Eastern Europe” (Cunningham, 2013, p. 5).  He stated that “in 2013 
same approach was applied but this time it included Japan” (Cunningham, 2013, p. 5). “These 
political decisions are going to help US allies to diversify and sustain energy security” 
(Cunningham, 2013, p. 5). 
 
 “Asia-Pacific region became more import dependent despite 76% increase in its domestic gas 
production between 2000 and 2011” (Henderson, 2012, p. 4). According to Henderson (2012, p. 
4) “consumption of gas has more than doubled and region’s need for gas imports has increased 
by almost 500% from 19 bcm to 112 bcm”. Figure 4.9 shows obvious difference in import 
requirements in the US and Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Figure 4.9The contrasting trend in import requirements in the US and Asia-Pacific 
(Henderson, 2012.p.5) 
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From the graph we can see that demand in Asia-Pacific region started to rise gradually with rapid 
growth after 2009. In US situation is different, “the import requirements were experiencing rises 
and falls, with trend going even more down after 2007” (Henderson, 2012, pp. 4-5).  
 
“This difference between trends caused by the difference in prices: Henry Hub gas price US$ 
2.36/mmbtu and Japan LNG price US$ 17/mmbtu in 2012” (Henderson, 2012, p. 5). Another 
“reason for such big gap between prices” according to Henderson (2012, p. 5) is “linked to the 
gas price dependence on oil prices”. However, Henderson (2012, p. 6) mentions some “key 
issues North American LNG is facing”. “The first one is related to the extend US exports will go. 
This he explains will depend on inter-related factors such as: results for the continuing 
development of the country’s unconventional and conventional gas resources, levels of US gas 
consumption, the impact of both on gas prices and political perceptions of the impact of gas 
exports on energy security and prices” (Henderson, 2012, p.6). The second issue mentioned by 
Henderson (2012, p. 6) is “the level and timing of exports from Canada”. He explains that “some 
of the Canadian suppliers will continue to look for oil-linked prices rather than accept a link to 
North American spot markets” (Henderson, 2012, p.6).  
 
Henderson (2012, p. 4) further explains that “during the period between 2000 and 2005 there was 
6% decline of production and it seemed that US would require imports of pipeline gas from 
Canada and LNG from the global market”. However, he explains that “after “shale gas 
revolution” the picture has changed: there was a 27% increase in gas production, a sharp fall in 
gas imports from Canada and many companies that have built LNG import terminals in the mid - 
2000s changed their strategies” (Henderson, 2012, p. 4). Moreover, “US gas import requirement 
has fallen by 65% since 2005, and it seems that country could be self-sufficient for nearly a 
decade” (Henderson, 2012, p. 4). 
 
 
Canadian LNG projects, and their competitive advantage 
 
“Canada is the fourth-largest exporter of natural gas, behind Russia, Norway, and Qatar” (EIA, 
2012a).Though “Canada has plans to export LNG all of Canada’s current natural gas exports are 
sent to U.S. markets via pipeline” (EIA, 2012a). “The US imported 3.1 Tcf (8.5 Bcf/d) of natural 
gas from Canada 2011, down from near-peak levels of 3.8 Tcf in 2007” (EIA, 2012a). “Although 
it was a main source of imported LNG for USA, changes in demand – supply balance influenced 
Canada as well” (EIA, 2012a). Thus, “seven LNG terminal plans have either been canceled or 
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suspended with exception of Canaport, Canada’s first and only operational regasification 
terminal, which began importing LNG in June 2009” (EIA, 2012a). “It has capacity of 1.2 Bcf/d 
and receives cargoes from Qatar due to a new long-term supply agreement” (EIA, 2012a).  
Kitimat project was “initially aimed to be import terminal, but changed into export terminal 
expected to process 5 million tons of LNG per year (mmtpa)” (EIA, 2012a). “The project owned 
by Apache 40% and EOG and Encana 30% each, is expected to start by 2015” (EIA, 2012a). 
“The companies are planning to sell their LNG on traditional oil-linked contracts rather than at 
Henry Hub related prices, reflecting the higher capital costs of these greenfield projects compare 
to US brownfield projects relying on Henry Hub priced gas supply source” (Henderson, 2012, 
pp. 17-18). “But reluctance of Asian buyers to sign those new contracts means that the project 
start might begin in 2017” (Henderson, 2012, p. 17). Another important issue states Henderson 
(2012, p. 18) is that “companies involved in the project have additional back-up supplies in the 
US, and the project is connected to the North American gas grid”. He explains that the “security 
of supply is not an issue for partners involved in the project” (Henderson, 2012, p.18). “In terms 
of marketing for the LNG”, he states that the “project partners estimate that the fully laden 
transport time to Asia is 11 days, which gives advantages as: relatively low transport costs, and 
flexibility in terms of reacting to spot markets” (Henderson, 2012, p. 18). Finally he states that 
“though the terms of contracts between project partners and Kogas and Gas Natural are not 
revealed, it is expected that project partners are oriented for long-term (20 year) contracts” 
(Henderson, 2012, p. 18). 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Access to markets – shipping distances (Ojeda,2013)  
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East African LNG 
According to EIA (2013b) “among five countries most actively involved in oil and gas activities 
(Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar) two have proposed LNG plant 
supporting infrastructure: Mozambique and Tanzania”. 
 
“In comparison to other African regions East Africa was among the least producing regions in 
2012 and second smallest gas producer in 2011: Mozambique and Tanzania are the only natural 
gas producers, with an output of 135 billion cubic feet (Bcf) and 30 Bcf of dry natural gas in 
2011, respectively” (EIA, 2013b). 
 
“According to the assessment of gas master plan for Mozambique, the country contains almost 
46.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent, or 279.9 Tcf equivalent, of discovered and undiscovered oil 
and gas resources” (EIA, 2013b). According to EIA (2013b) “more than 70% of those 
discoveries are located in Rovuma offshore north region and are made by Anadarko and Eni. But  
it is unclear what portion of Anadarko and Eni’s resource estimates are economically viable 
because both companies have not yet publically stated reserve estimates for their discoveries and 
have not indicated the amount that is commercially viable”.  
 
Tanzania 
 
“Tanzania had 230 million cubic feet of proved natural gas reserves as of January 1, 2013 and 
does not have any proved crude oil reserves” (EIA, 2013b). Similarly to Mozambique Tanzania 
does not have “export infrastructure for gas transportation and processing”, so there are a lot to 
do for companies interested in LNG developments (EIA, 2013b).  EIA (2013b) states that 
“Tanzanian offshore discoveries are smaller than in Mozambique and commercial development 
of new offshore discoveries is expected to be slower and later than Mozambique”.  
 
There are two companies operating in the area: “BG group and Statoil and they face similar 
issues as Andarko and Eni in Mozambique” (EIA, 2013b). “They had success in offshore 
Tanzania each finding more than 10 Tcf of recoverable gas resources” (EIA, 2013b). None of 
these companies “have publically released a reserve estimate for their discoveries and economic 
viability is not clear as well” (EIA, 2013b).  
Table 4.10 Natural gas in East Africa (EIA, 2013b) 
Country Notable oil & gas 
discoveries 
Proposed infrastructure Companies 
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Mozambique 32-65 Tcf of 
recoverable gas 
resources in Area 1 
(Anadarko) and75 Tcf 
gas in place in Area 4 
(Eni) 
LNG Plant and 
supporting infrastructure 
Anadarko and Eni 
Tanzania More than 20 Tcf of 
recoverable gas 
resources in Blocks 1-4 
LNG Plant and 
supporting infrastructure 
BG Group, Statoil, 
Ophir Energy, 
ExxonMobil, Aminex 
Note: “the companies are only those that made notable oil and gas discoveries and having 
activities in the fields” (EIA, 2013b) . 
 
Additional Considerations for Mozambique and Tanzania 
 
According to EIA (2013b) report “among the biggest uncertainties that Mozambique and 
Tanzania face is the global LNG market up to and beyond 2020”. “According to Wood 
Mackenzie estimates by 2020 there will be oversupply of LNG as global LNG supply surpassed 
demand by about 100 MMtpa” (EIA, 2013b). At the same time EIA (EIA, 2013b) warns that, 
“Chevron estimates show that LNG demand will outstrip supply by about 120 MMtpa by 2025, 
resulting in a supply shortfall”.  
 
In general “global liquefaction supply and demand will depend on many factors” and most of 
them are still uncertain (EIA, 2013b). Among those factors listed by EIA (2013b) are: “shale gas 
supply growth in North America and China, growth in liquefaction capacity in various regions 
(particularly in North America, Australia, the Middle East, and East Africa), regional LNG 
demand growth (particularly in Asia), the expansion of LNG in transportation sectors in various 
countries, fuel price differentials, the expansion of technologies and infrastructure, and several 
others”.  
 
Russia and China 
 
“Russia has the potential to produce significant gas from its Eastern Regions, with total proved 
reserves in East Siberia and the Far East of Russia standing at 5 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) while 
prospective resources could be as large as 65Tcm” (Henderson & Stern, 2014,p. 2, cited in 
Gazprom, 2013). Henderson and Stern (2014, p. 2) suggest that “this opportunity gives Russia to 
have competitive advantage in the Asia Pacific region and particularly for Japan, and fast 
growing gas markets in China and India” (cited in IEA, 2013). Thus, there is “Sakhalin 2 project 
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selling 10.8 mt (14.6 Bcm) of LNG per annum into the neighboring Asian markets and there are 
local rivals of Gazprom in Russia - Rosneft and Novatek” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 2).  
 
According to Henderson (2011) “Russian Energy strategy to 2030 oriented to the future growth 
will be focused to the East. It is expected that Gazprom is going to be the major player because it 
possess major assets in East Russia including Sakhalin 2, Chayanda and Kovykta fields” 
(Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 2). “The “Power of Siberia” pipeline is expected to be 3,500 
kilometers from East Siberia to the Pacific Coast, with a spur pipeline down into NE China at the 
border point of Blagoveshensk” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 3). Based on Gazprom (2014) 
estimates “this spur pipeline would carry 38 Bcm of gas into China and the remaining amount is 
going to be distributed between domestic market and a 10-15 mt LNG facility that is planned to 
be built at Vladivostok” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 3). This route is “estimated to cost US$ 
80-90 billion and negotiations with China concerning spur pipeline of 38Bcm capacity have not 
finished” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 3). But the crisis in Ukraine might have influence on the 
decisions that Russia and China will take (Song, 2014). Henderson and Stern (2014, p. 4) based 
on earlier reports of 2014 comment that “Gazprom and CNPC were getting closer to agreeing a 
base price with a range of US$ 10-11/mmbtu at the Russian border being mentioned”. According 
to their analysis “both parties at this price can be satisfied: Gazprom would make an adequate 
return and CNPC would receive gas whose cost-reflective price at the Chinese eastern seaboard 
would probably equal that of imports arriving by pipe from Central Asia” (Henderson & Stern, 
2014, p.4, cited in Stern, 2013) The final outcome will be clear “after Putin’s visit to Beijing in 
May 2014” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p.4 cited in Interfax, 2014).  
 
Vladivostok-LNG project will start operating in 2018 with the target market of Asia-Pacific 
region (Henderson & Stern, 2014). “Gazprom compiled a list of potential strategic partners, 
whose overall stake in the project might amount to 49%, provided they purchased at least 6 
million tons of LNG to be produced as part of the project” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 6).  
 
“In reality, there are only two companies Rosneft and Novatek having projects which qualify: 
Novatek has Yamal LNG scheme that is expected to be Russia’s next and ultimately largest LNG 
export project” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 6). This project “scheduled start date of 2017 but 
harsh climate conditions and difficult access to Asian markets in winter months if it is not 
delivered by a very long route via the Suez Canal might be the reason that only half of the 
potential output will reach Eastern markets” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 7). CNPC has 20% 
share in the project and will take at least 3.0 mtpa of LNG (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 7).  
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According to Henderson and Stern (2014, p. 7) “Yamal project is seen as economically viable 
due to its estimated price for the gas US$ 10-11/mmbtu which can give a competitive advantage 
even with the new US LNG projects at a Henry Hub price of US$ 45/mmbtu”.  Moreover, this 
project “has signed a contract with CNPC and thus making a competition to Gazprom in Asia” 
(Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 7). Another project is “Sakhalin 1 where Rosneft and Exxon are 
partners and have plans for supplies to Asia” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 7). Henderson and 
Stern (2014, p. 7)  suggest that this project has “more political” logic than economic. It might 
happen that “Rosneft could start exporting LNG before Gazprom since it has already secured 
preliminary agreements for all 5mtpa of potential output from the project, and has suggested a 
first production target in 2019” (Henderson & Stern, 2014, p. 7).  
 
Henderson and Stern (2014, p. 8) furthermore suggest that the “potential outcome for Russia’s 
LNG in Asia will depend on contract with China” especially after crisis in Ukraine. In a 
conclusion Henderson and Stern (2014) suggest that there will be “possible over supply due to 
the other competing exporters and it is important for Russia to sign contracts with China. The 
early 2020 is expected to be very competitive for LNG suppliers in Asia” (Henderson & Stern, 
2014, p. 8). 
 
4.3.2 Fukushima effect 
 
“Japan relies on imported gas to meet its needs because it does not have own resources” (EIA, 
2013c). It is “the world’s largest LNG importer, accounted for 37% of the global market share of 
LNG demand in 2012, rising from 33% in 2011” (EIA, 2013c).  
 
Rogers and Stern (2014, p. 14) in their report on Asian LNG markets show “demand growth for 
gas in Asia during the period 2000-2012 which is on average 6.6%/year”. “Japan achieved 
consumption level of some 95 Bcma prior to Fukushima, but growth slowed significantly in the 
late 2000s” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 8) . After closure of Fukushima situation was as follow: 
“nuclear stations demand increased by 23%; South Korea and Taiwan had consumption growth 
of 8.4%/year” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 8). For China “it have grown by a factor of five since 
2000, supplied by domestic consumption and by pipeline imports from Turkmenistan (from 
2010) and Myanmar (from 2013), and by LNG from a variety of sources since 2006” (Rogers 
and Stern, 2014, p. 8). For India “growth was of 6.3% on average since 2000 but had declined 
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since 2010” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p.8).A period between  2010-12 accounted for 86% of 
demand growth in natural gas consumption for Japan and China” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 8). 
 
Table 4.11 Asia/Pacific National Natural Gas Consumption (Bcma) ad Compound Annual 
Average Growth % (Rogers and Stern, 2014) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 CAGR% 
Japan 72 74 73 80 77 79 84 90 94 87 95 106 117 4.1 
South 
Korea 
19 21 23 24 28 30 32 35 36 34 43 46 50 8.4 
Taiwan 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 11 14 16 16 8.4 
China 28 30 32 36 42 49 59 73 84 93 111 134 147 15.0 
India 26 26 28 30 32 36 37 40 41 51 62 61 55 6.3 
Thailand 22 25 27 29 30 33 33 35 37 39 45 47 51 7.3 
Australia 21 22 22 22 23 22 24 27 26 25 26 26 25 1.8 
Bangladesh 10 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 20 20 22 6.7 
Indonesia 30 31 33 35 32 33 33 31 33 37 40 37 36 1.6 
Malaysia 24 25 26 27 25 31 34 33 34 33 34 32 33 2.7 
New 
Zealand 
6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 -2.4 
Pakistan 22 23 25 30 34 36 36 37 38 38 40 39 41 5.6 
Philippines 0 0 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 60.9 
Singapore 0 1 4 4 5 7 7 9 8 8 8 9 8 105.1 
Vietnam 2 2 2 2 4 6 7 7 7 8 9 8 9 15.9 
Other Asia 
Pacific 
4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 4.1 
Total 290 308 324 351 366 397 424 457 480 497 560 594 625 6.6 
Source: BP (2013), Gas consumption worksheet (Rogers and Stern, 2014) 
Note: blue color- LNG importers in 2012, purple LNG exporters in 2012 
 “Japan’s LNG requirements are assumed to be reduced during 2014 and 2015” (Rogers and 
Stern, 2014, p. 9). As for the “growing trend for LNG” it will be in China (Rogers and Stern, 
2014, p. 9). But there are many uncertain issues: “potential domestic production of coal and bed 
methane and shale gas, pipeline imports from Central Asia and whether agreement is reached for 
pipeline imports from Russia” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 9). Impact of “Fukushima disaster and 
decline of nuclear generation which was compensated partially by increase in LNG as power 
generation fuel was severe for Japanese companies due to the two reasons: loss of low cost 
nuclear and additional LNG supplies required” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 9).  
 
The studies made by Rogers and Stern (2014, p. 11) on “Fukushima effect” showed that “after 
Fukushima disaster companies from an aggregate “normal year” profit of US$5 billion in FY 
2011 and 2012 generated a loss of over US$10 billion excluding Tokyo Electric (TEPCO) and 
some of US$20 billion including TEPCO”. Based on this they assume that “in 2014-15 
70 
 
significant proportion of Japan’s nuclear plant will be re-started. As for prices for importing 
countries: in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China they include LNG imported under long term 
contracts and spot cargoes” (Rogers and Stern, 2014, p. 11). Here Rogers and Stern (2014, p. 11) 
see the reason for “Japan’s higher average price” paid by Japan post Fukushima as a “possible 
reflection of its position of “distressed buyer” for spot cargoes during this period”.  
 
The question arises on how long this Fukushima effect will last (Rogers and Stern, 2014).  
 
Several “Japanese utilities are actively investing in overseas projects, particularly in Australian 
LNG export projects” (Lee, 2014, p. 1). “Companies such as Tokyo gas, Chubu electric and 
other companies that heat Japan are changing their attitudes towards LNG export projects: 
instead of signing contracts and waiting for the first cargo they actively buy small shares in 
ambitious gas developments” (Lee, 2014, p. 1). Lee (2014) suggest that “they hope to gain 
reliable supply sources on “fair” prices through active engagement in upstream and midstream 
links”. According to Lee (2014, p. 1) it is expected that the “companies may gain in these 
projects advantages such as: insider access to project plans, spending and technology; the chance 
to build relationships that smooth the way to long-term gas supply contracts; protection against 
price upswings; a better understanding of project economics and market trends. Another 
possibility for utilities through this engagement is that utility might get a share of gas reserves 
and influence decision where LNG tanker delivers its cargo”. 
Table 4.12 Japanese utilities investment in Australia LNG projects (Lee, 2014) 
Japanese utilities investment in Australia LNG projects 
Project Utility Ownership stake LNG under 
contract to utility 
Length of sales 
contract 
DARWIN LNG (2006) 3.6 mtpa total capacity 
Upstream Tokyo Timor Sea 
Resources (a 
joint venture 
between Tokyo 
Electric and 
Tokyo Gas) 
9.20%   
LNG project Tokyo Electric 6.13% 2 mtpa 17 years 
Tokyo Gas 3.07% 1 mtpa 17 years 
PLUTO LNG (2012) 4.3 mtpa total capacity 
Upstream & 
LNG Project 
Kansai Electric 5% 1.75 mtpa 15 years 
Tokyo Gas 5% 1.5-1.75 mtpa 15 years 
QUEENSLAND CURTIS LNG (2014*) 9 mtpa total capacity 
Upstream Tokyo Gas 1.250%   
LNG project Tokyo Gas 2.500% 1.2 mtpa 20 years 
GORGON (2015*) 15.6 mtpa total capacity 
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Upstream & 
LNG project 
Osaka Gas 1.25% 1.375 mtpa 25 years 
Tokyo Gas 1% 1.1 mtpa 25 years 
Chubu Electric 0.417% 1.44 mtpa 25 years 
WHEATSTONE (2016*) 8.9 mtpa total capacity 
Upstream Kyushu Electric 
Power 
1.830%   
Tokyo Electric 0.820%   
LNG project Kyushu Electric 
Power 
1.460% 0.7 mtpa 20 years 
Tokyo Electric 0.656% 4.2 mtpa 20 years 
ICHTHYS (End of 2016*) 8.4 mtpa total capacity 
Upstream & 
LNG project 
Tokyo Gas 1.575% 1.05 mtpa 15 years 
Osaka Gas 1.200% 0.8 mtpa 15 years 
Chubu Electric 0.735% 0.49 mtpa 15 years 
Toho Gas 0.420% 0.28 mtpa 15 ears 
*- Projected start-up date 
Mtpa = million metric tons per annum (1 million metric tons equals 48.7 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas) 
Asian consumers are concerned about future sources of LNG (Bradshaw, et al., 2013). Thus 
“besides actively investing in Australian LNG projects they consider five sets of options” 
(Bradshaw, et al., 2013, p. 15): 
 
Table 4.13 Summary of new options for Asia’s LNG supply (Bradshaw, et al., 2013) 
Source Advantages and attractions Disadvantages and risks 
United States  Access to resources relatively 
open 
 Low gas prices (currently) and 
large resource potential 
 Political stability 
 Existing infrastructure offering 
lower unit costs for liquefaction 
 
 Uncertain policy governing exports 
 Gas prices could rise substantially 
 Local opposition to select projects 
 Most project developers lacking deep 
balance sheets to finance projects 
Canada  Large estimated resource 
potential 
 Access to resources relatively 
open 
 Proximity to Asian markets 
 Possible economies of scale 
 Experienced project sponsors 
 Resource poorly delineated so far  
 Cost inflation from LNG/oil sands 
 Large pipeline investments needed 
 Long lead time to negotiate pipeline 
right-of-way 
 Development to require high prices 
Mozambique  Large resource discovered 
 Possible economies of scale 
 Limited government capacity 
 High entry (acquisition) costs 
 Developers lacking LNG track record 
 Number of stakeholders risks delays 
 Undefined terms for gas development 
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Tanzania  Large estimated resource 
potential 
 Proximity to Asian markets 
 Government potentially allocating some 
of the gas to the local market 
 Low government capacity to approve and 
advance projects 
 More discoveries needed to support 
large-scale projects 
Russia   
Sakhalin 
(Gazprom) 
 Existing infrastructure offering 
lower unit costs for liquefaction 
 Proximity to Asian markets 
 Uncertain resource base 
Sakhalin 
(Rosneft) 
 Large existing resource 
 Proximity to Asian markets 
 Experienced partner 
(ExxonMobil) 
 Uncertainty over the ability to export 
without Gazprom intermediation 
Vladivostok  Large resource base 
 Possible economies of scale 
 Large pipeline investments needed 
 Limited partnership interest so far 
 Difficult to justify investment without 
also building a pipeline to China 
 Much less economic than an expansion at 
Sakhalin 
Yamal  Large resource discovered 
 Possible economies of scale 
 Project operator lacking LNG track 
record 
 Uncertainty over the ability to export 
without Gazprom intermediation 
 Projects requiring an additional partner 
and lacking secure financing 
 
Bradshaw, et.al  (2013, p. 15) warn: “Although Australia offers more political stability than these 
countries, costs are higher and the potential exists for an environmental backlash against 
unconventional gas development in eastern Australia”. 
 
Conclusion: Analysis of external factors is showing us that after Fukushima disaster there is 
high demand for LNG. But Australia is not the only country planning for this Asia pacific 
region. There are many rivals and competition should not be underestimated. First of all 
suppliers compete in the market and secondly countries like Japan and China are securing their 
future by signing agreements and investing in shares in the projects. Australia is depending on its 
customers and they have leverages of control. The future prices for LNG will be one of the 
drivers of this process. External factors also have influence of decision making for Australian 
LNG projects. Fukushima effect was not predictable but has impact on demand and investments.  
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4.4  “Landed cost” challenge 
 
There is specific market mechanism working in Australia which is influencing prices for natural 
gas across the country (BREE, 2013). “East and West Australia are experiencing major changes 
due to the development of new resources and export projects” (BREE, 2013, p. 18).  “The Henry 
Hub price could possibly become a global spot price for LNG trade at new export facilities and 
not just for contracted supply from the United States” (BREE, 2013, p. 15). Thus Australian 
energy bureau is emphasizing importance of gas market reform. As a “possible model Australia 
might choose Henry Hub in North America, with its high levels of transparency and efficient 
physical and financial markets” (BREE, 2013, p. 19). But it is debatable whether Australia will 
use this model because it requires “certain conditions and infrastructure” (BREE, 2013, p. 19).  
 
“High costs and delays of Australian LNG projects might have negative impact in the future 
prices of LNG” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 3). Ellis et. al (2013, p. 3) calculated that “if Australia can 
return its productivity levels to the long term average, income growth would amount to 3.7% by 
2017. Failure to do this will result in income faltering and the prosperity of the entire economy 
being challenged for the first time in many years”.  
 
It is estimated that “delivery cost for new Australian projects will be 20-30% more costly 
compare to Canadian and Mozambique projects” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 10). Ellis, et. al (2013, p. 
13) suggests that in order to be successful “Australia has to overcome this gap through 
productivity in sector”. “As a main challenge” Ellis, et. al (2013, p. 11) see the “commitment of 
individual companies to continue investing in these projects”. In order to make analysis Ellis et. 
al (2013) decided to compare Australian projects with competitors in Canada and Mozambique.  
Thus, “a coal seam gas  (CSG) onshore project in Australia compared to an unconventional gas 
project in Canada as proxy for North America, and conventional project in Australia is compared 
to a conventional project in Mozambique as proxy for East Africa” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 10). 
They define delivery costs as “landed cost” or as a “cost for delivering LNG to Japan” (Ellis, et 
al., 2013, pp. 9-11). Ellis et.al (2013, p.10) suggest that “if Australia manage to convince 
operators to develop their facilities in Australia rather than East Africa or North America landed 
or delivery cost will be competitive”  
 
Table below shows that landed cost for Australian-sourced LNG is higher than other countries: 
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“Break-even landed costs in Japan in US$/mmbtu have 20-30% gap compare to rivals” (Ellis, et 
al., 2013, p. 11)  
 
Table 4.14 Landed cost comparison (Bradshaw, et al., 2013) 
Australia 
Unconventional 
Canada 
Unconventional 
Australia 
Conventional 
Mozambique 
Conventional 
12.0 9.2-9.5 11.9 9.0-10.0 
 
After analyzing the concept of “landed cost” Ellis et. al (2013, p. 13) offered to consider critical 
factors influencing costs by differentiating them into two main categories: “compressible 
differences and incompressible differences”.  
Here is the table to compare these differences and see how they make difference between costs 
in Australia and Canada: 
Table 4.15 Compressible and incompressible differences: Australia vs Canada (Bradshaw, 
et al., 2013) 
Compressible differences: Comparison: Australia vs Canada 
Tax Taxes on gas in Australia are 0.8US$/mmbtu higher than in 
Canada. Absence of a Canadian equivalent to the Petroleum 
Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) 
Regulatory approval time It is assumed that Australian projects experience 3 month longer 
FEED period, resulting from a longer time required for permits 
and approvals. This adds 0.03US$/mmbtu to the cost 
Labor productivity Australian workers spent 8% longer time compare to Canadians. 
This adds 0.2 US$/mmbtu 
Service market maturity ( 
materials, equipment and 
freight) 
Freight rates for material and equipment are 0.2US$/mmbtu 
higher in Australia. Equipment is more expensive but raw 
materials cheaper in Australia, adding 0.1US$/mmbtu. 
Industry collaboration   
Project optimization 
(design specifications) 
Costs difference caused by operators choice of design and 
economies of scale. In Australia it adds 0.3US$/mmbtu. Note: 
Canadian project used for comparison is larger in capacity than 
Australian. 
Incompressible 
differences: 
 
Reservoir characteristics It is assumed that Australian project 20 to 30% more wells per 
mtpa than the Canadian. This adds 0.6-0.9 US$/mmbtu. 
Climate related plant 
efficiency 
Liquefaction facilities in Australian require larger capacity than 
Canadian due to high temperature. This adds 0.2US$/mmbtu. 
Inflation In Australian inflation rates are higher than in Canada. This adds 
0.3US$/mmbtu. 
Shipping  Australia has cost advantage compare to Canada since it is closer 
to Japan. Advantage is 0.1US$/mmbtu. 
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Pipeline length Australia has slight advantage compare to Canada because 
Australian CSG fields are closer to the coast. 
 
Ellis et. al (2013) recommend to work through the differences listed in the table. But the main 
implications given by them include “industry collaboration” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 20). They 
assume that “working through industry collaborated could give cost improvement around 1.0-1.8 
US$/mmbtu if there will be five potential measures taken” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 20). These five 
measures are as follows: “industry wide standardization; smoother demand; share plant 
infrastructure; joint operation and maintenance companies; and cooperation on health, safety and 
environmental standards” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 20).  Further suggestions given are about “project 
optimization” including: lean engineering; lean concept and design; best – in – class contract 
management; claims management; lean operations in production” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 21). Ellis 
et. al (2013, p. 25) put emphasis on “considering opportunities through brownfield developments 
and technological break-through giving example of Shell’s FLNG technology”. It is assumed 
that “FLNG plant compare to LNG facility can reduce landed cost by roughly US$1-1.4/mmbtu 
including impact on government revenues and other costs (given that there will be a 2-train 8-
mtpa development and cost of capital of 7.8% over 40 years of field)” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 25).  
 
Finally, Ellis et. al (2013, p. 27) believe that “the key to success is taking action by individual 
effort  and working in cooperation”. In order to have evidence for their proposals Ellis et. al 
(2013, p. 28) use examples of Norway and UK. They describe these two countries as successful 
ones: “Their experiences demonstrate the value of forethought and a nuanced but managed 
evolution in industry arrangements” (Ellis, et al., 2013, p. 28). 
 
Conclusion made on external and internal factors analysis: Landed cost for Australian LNG 
projects is additional challenge. It is caused by internal factors and comparison with the rivals 
shows how critical it is to increase reduce productivity gap. External factors are making internal 
issues more obvious and increase uncertainty. These challenges are industrial critical success 
factors and can be managed through cooperation.  
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4.5 Lessons learned: future is uncertain, most of the “critical success factors” change over 
time 
1. Lesson: Deadlines for projects were spurred by demand in Asia.  Planned projects are 
oriented towards 2020 in order to meet demand requirements.   
 
2. Lesson: There is high concentration of the projects in the Western Australia. Australia is 
attractive for investments but this is causing competition for resources. This is increasing costs 
and shifts dates even more. 
 
3. Lesson: There is cost escalation over time, it can be estimated approximately but it is difficult 
to know exact cost of a project. Factors such as Australian currency appreciation and external 
competition are difficult to predict. 
 
4. Lesson: Asian market is target market for Australian LNG. But customers diversifying 
supplies and have alternative options.   
 
5. Lesson: Landed cost for Australian LNG will be another challenge even after projects are 
completed. 
 
6. Lesson: Fukushima effect occurred as unexpected event increasing demand for LNG and 
could not be predicted. Thus for instance, Fukushima disaster happened in 2011, and Gorgon, 
Wheatstone and Pluto decision was taken before it. In case of Pluto there was 25% over budget, 
after completion in case of Gorgon it is already 40% cost overrun. It is not possible to estimate 
exactly how much events like “Fukushima” can influence project costs and delays. 
 
7. Lesson: Customers securing supply through investments in Australian LNG projects 
 
8. Lesson: Project participants have different expectations: Asian investors have to invest more 
due to the cost overruns but this will make them expect for high price on future LNG (Bradshaw, 
et al., 2013). 
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5. Discussion and analysis 
 
5.1. Seven deadly mistakes identified by Pinto 
 
Pinto (2013) concluded that project cost overruns and delays are often linked to the seven 
mistakes that managers tend to repeat. For evidence he makes comparison between similar 
projects in order to estimate approximate cost. Therefore I made sort of benchmarking and 
comparison of three projects and two existing facilities. Important findings are that different 
types of projects have different critical success factors ad they have different effect on them. 
Pinto (2013) gave cases of construction projects for Olympics and there was no internal neither 
external competition when projects were planned and implemented. The reason for that is 
different goal of the projects and different industry. Oil and gas is capital intensive industry and 
has more uncertainties. During planning phase of projects there was a competition in the country 
and in the target market. The first mistake is related to optimism bias according to Pinto (2013).  
But there are factors changing over time such as increased number of LNG projects in the same 
area in Australia and suppliers from abroad signing contracts with Asian consumers. Therefore 
we cannot call it a mistake when projects tried to be “on-time” and “on-budget”. The previous 
experience of NWSV could be used as benchmark but there were different critical success 
factors at that time period and there was less competition.  
Second mistake defined by Pinto (2013) as “massaging the plan” can be seen from different 
perspectives. The research conducted on NWSV showed that there is cost escalation which is 
unavoidable. Thus, since 2000 Australian currency started to become stronger due to the 
investments and developments in various industries. Perhaps at a time of calculations of Browse 
project for example they voted for Kimberley option since it was viable in terms of prices and 
conditions in 2008. Reevaluation before final investment decision in 2013 showed that it is not 
commercially viable anymore. At the same time knowing the deficit of labor and high wages did 
not stop Gorgon and Wheatstone projects from getting approved. Both of them are operated of 
Chevron US based company and both of them are located in the Western Australia the most 
resource rich part. This concentration of projects made problem of labor deficit and high wages 
worse. The CEO of Woodside Peter Coleman emphasized that he is Australian- based while 
others are not. What were the key drivers motivating Chevron to invest in these two projects? As 
we have seen US LNG have commercial and geopolitical logic. How much did it influence their 
decision in terms of Australian LNG projects? May be they were more concerned about 
geopolitical logic to export LNG to Japan. May be that was the key motivator and additional 
pressure on final investment decision. 
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 Can we assume that there was “project death marches” as a third mistake? It is difficult to 
answer. From the schedule of project we see that they have approximately same dates to start 
varying from 2014 to 2020. This is because they studied demand of target market and it was 
reasonable to plan for those dates. So the demand for LNG from Asian consumers was factor 
pressing on decision and it does not actually depend much on project managers in this case. 
Moreover Asian consumers are securing supply by signing additional contracts with other 
suppliers. 
 Fifth mistake was called as “lack of relevant knowledge” and may be that was Coleman was 
referring to in his interview that most of participants lack previous experience. Important to note 
that “poor change control” was not the case for Browse project, they changed the concept and 
selected FLNG thus postponing final investment decision. We do not know exactly what other 
projects did and whether they used “rework”.  
As a final mistakes Pinto (2013) defines “superficial risk management” as result of human bias 
and recommends to be proactive than reactive by studying “learning loops” and to study similar 
projects. At the same time in case of Australian projects the threats and challenges are so 
unpredictable that even if managers will do rework and be proactive it is not possible to 
completely avoid the costs. Example of London Olympics recommended by Pinto (2013) is good 
to consider but it operates in different environment and has different “content” and different 
critical success factors. Despite commitment of managers to these projects it was not possible to 
avoid these “seven deadly sins” or mistakes. Moreover, from the empirical findings we can see 
that first of all LNG industry like oil and gas is capital intensive and has more challenges and 
uncertainties than Olympic projects for example. Therefore, perhaps it is better to refer to “seven 
deadly sins” as “seven deadly challenges”? 
Table 5.1 Analysis of “Australian challenges” based on “seven deadly sins”( Pinto,2013) 
“Optimism bias” Happened as a result of previous experience of major companies. But 
Australian legislation is different than in US, Canada and Europe. They did 
not know how much it will have influence on costs and delays 
“Massaging the 
plan” 
 Happened as a result of unavoidable cost escalation and competition – 
may be “the numbers were correct” for that particular time under particular 
conditions, but they changed through the time thus showing the plan in the 
present as “massaged” 
“Creating death 
marches” 
Perhaps participants had different priorities, thus for some companies it 
was to develop Australian LNG industry as a national company 
(Woodside) and for others there were geopolitical implications as securing 
supply to their allies (Chevron) 
“End date-driven 
schedules” 
Were the dates set by managers actually or is it pressure from consumers? 
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“Lack of relevant 
project 
management 
training” 
This is not completely the fault of managers but it is the result that some 
companies are comparatively new in the industry 
“Poor change 
control” 
How many changes at a time a manager can do? There are factors 
depending on them but most of them are beyond of control 
“Superficial risk” Analyzing event and then going back to the first step to check for 
opportunities and threats and analyze again what might happen can help to 
reduce risk. But do we know exactly what might happen? 
 
Pinto states that being proactive is better than being reactive. But as we see from illustration 
“opportunity/threat” is showing what might happen. He suggests when undesired event occurs to 
go to this step and analyze it. But how accurate can we analyze it? How do we know what might 
happen? Our assumptions are linked to various factors: change in external and internal 
environment and human factor. Even this approach does not guarantee that we can avoid 
unexpected costs and delays. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Proactive action and uncertainty 
 
Analysis on challenges faced by Australian LNG projects brought to the following conclusions: 
Table 5.2 Suggestions made by Pinto (2013) and challenges faced within Australian 
projects 
“reference class forecasting” Even if managers know common challenges faced by projects it 
is used it does not prevent from costs and delays. 
Do we 
know it 
exactly ? 
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“rework” It helps to minimize risk but does not completely prevent from 
delays and costs, thus Browse was postponed. 
“authenticity” May be managers were “authentic” enough during planning 
process but circumstances changed and plan looks “biased”. 
 
 
5.2 Scenario planning 
 
Scenario planning principles “bring changes whether proposed scenario is accepted or not” 
(Kahane, 2012). Here we can argue with Wright (2004) about “socially constructive nature of 
scenario planning”: yes we do influence scenario since we plan it, but, it can show us how what 
we should do in order to overcome consequences.  
There are different projects and stories of success or failure. But after scenarios are built we can 
find out an answer to the question what to do next. Kahane (2012) suggests that scenarios show 
“how to discover what can and must be done”. According to Kahane (2012) scenario should be 
used when people find themselves in following situation: “1. Situation is seen unacceptable, 
unstable or unsustainable; 2. People involved in this situation cannot transform situation on their 
own or by working only with their friends and colleagues. 3. People cannot transform the 
situation directly. The actors are too polarized to be able to see it differently”. Thus Kahane 
(2012) believes that through “transformation of understandings, relationships and intentions 
actors can transform their actions”. 
 
KPMG (2011, p.12) suggests to ask questions before building scenario regarding “participants, 
stakeholders and the owners of the exercise; specific purpose of the exercise; key future events 
that should be examined; and when in the future are these events (scenarios) going to occur”. 
After answering these questions KPMG (2011, p. 12) recommends five key phases for scenario 
planning process: “scan internal and external environment; build possible scenarios (select from 
four); identifying and planning response; identify the five most realistic futures; and implement 
responses for possible scenarios when they are most likely to happen”. Thus in the uncertain 
environment scenario planning process can help to minimize risk caused by unexpected costs 
and delays. It does not prevent from cost overruns or delays, but rather helps to analyze the 
“possibility and likelihood of unexpected event” (KPMG, 2011,p.12). 
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5.3 Critical success factors 
 
Empirical findings on Australian LNG projects showed how critical success factors change over 
time and influenced by independent factors such as situation in Australia and international 
market environment.  Thus, even if managers identify them at the beginning of planning process 
the future events are uncertain and they might face a strategy paradox. “Uncertainty increases 
over time and management of commitments should be separated from management of 
uncertainty” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 22).  Scenario planning helps to see “strategic planning as a 
continuous process” (Parker Gates, 2010, p. 22): 
  
 
Figure 5.2 Rework and strategic planning through scenario planning 
 These arrows linking the quadrants can be seen as “rework and learning loops” offered by Pinto 
(2013).   
 
5.4 “Human Factor” 
Wong (2007) defined success in project management through the concept “getting results and 
feeling good about it”. 
Meeting 
people’s 
expectations 
 
 
 
High 
Partial Success 
 
Success  
Failure 
 
Low  
Partial Success 
 
High 
Meeting Project Expectations 
Figure 5.3 Project success and alternative realities 
 
Who are they? Do they have 
same expectations? 
What influences them? 
expectations? 
“Expected reality” 
formed by 
project’s and 
people’s 
expectations 
might change  
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He suggests that first it should be “project” and “human expectations” to be met (Wong, 2007). 
By “project expectations” he means: “results meet project objectives, which includes being on-
time, on spec and within budget” (Wong, 2007). By “people’s expectations” he defines: “the 
values are respected, people feel fulfilled, and they succeed together as a team” (Wong, 2007). 
But, as we have seen from Pinto’s (2013, p.645) suggestions “managers tend to be under 
pressure when they are oriented towards deadlines”. Secondly, how can we know about values of 
people in the project for sure and how much they coincide with project objectives. Thus, project 
objectives put pressure on people and they might be under stress. May be it is true for the project 
when we do not consider external environment and unexpected circumstances. At the same time 
it is “people” setting deadlines and costs. What if there are several project participants and they 
have different values and motives can they be equally “happy”? Expectations hurt when they do 
not coincide with reality. Reality is changing and to some degree created by people. Can people 
create right reality so that both project and people’s expectations meet? If we assume that project 
is finished on-time and on-budget how can we know that stakeholder expectations and values 
were met? Can we call that project successful? What is influencing people’s expectations? If 
project completed on-time and on-budget it will probably make people happy. After completion 
of projects level of satisfaction with project will probably depend on return on investments.  
So we can remake figure in a following way: 
 
People might not be completely happy if their values were not respected. 
At the same time: 
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Of course companies also have their values and strategic objectives and when they plan it is 
better to see the strategic planning as a “non-static but cyclical process” as recommended by 
Parker Gates (2010, p. 22). 
 
Scenario planning gives several options and thus both project and people’s expectations can meet 
in different ways because it prepares them for different realities. Scenario planning principles 
also teach how to ask right questions such as who are participants? When we expect only one 
reality and do not consider participants people’s and project expectations do not coincide.  
 
5.5 Do we plan future or is it future influencing our decisions?  
 
There were many approaches discussed for managing future uncertainty. “Scenario planning is 
helping us to think out of the box” (Kahane, 2012). There is criticism on scenario saying that it is 
“subjective and it has social constructionist nature” (Wright, 2004). It is true in one way because 
it is people who create scenario. At the same time there are factors influencing future outcome 
beyond our control, most of them are difficult to measure. Factors influence project outcome and 
decision making process as well. At the same time we see that the projects are also influencing 
situation in Australia (Policy priorities to extend LNG exports, e.g). Firstly, we can see price 
mechanism as example that has to change in order to make LNG price index more simple and 
predictable (BREE, 2013). It is assumed that Australia might use Henry Hub pricing (BREE, 
2013). Secondly legislation is slowing down project approvals, at the same time, government is 
working on changing it because of the projects. Finally, labor deficit is negatively affecting the 
project outcome, but projects are training people and attracting various specialists from different 
countries.  
 
RDS principles are helping to learn from mistakes, do necessary “rework” mentioned by Pinto 
(2013). As we see current challenges affect projects but projects also influence them and change. 
“In all cases proposed scenarios bring transformation whether accepted or not” (Kahane, 2012).  
 
 “Human factor” is also uncertain not only for future predictions but for present as well. Despite 
criticism of Foster (2013)regarding “forecaster factor”, we can conclude that even econometric 
reports are influenced by “human factor” through “massaging the plan” (Pinto, 2013). Moreover, 
as we have seen from ACIL Tasman report on North West Shelf Venture, future costs are not 
100% predictable, and the cost shown before final investment decision is usually in today’s 
prices (Begley, 2009). Scenario planning in this case can be helpful by allowing several possible 
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costs for future projects thus “minimizing the bias” and keeping managers more “authentic” 
(Pinto, 2013). 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary of the study 
 
This paper studied the reasons of cost overruns and delays in projects, the factors causing and 
influencing them and approaches to plan for future. In the theoretical part I have analyzed 
findings of various researchers on reasons causing cost overruns and delays, factors influencing 
decision and outcome of the projects and management tools used to plan for future in uncertain 
environment. I have analyzed “seven deadly sins” of Pinto (2013), scenario planning used by 
Kahane (2012) and KPMG (2011), critical success factors of Parker Gates (2010) and “Human 
factor” of Wong (2007). Empirical data was built on three LNG projects and two existing 
facilities of Australia and analysis of internal, external environment together with “Fukushima 
effect” and “landed cost” challenges. Through examining three LNG projects I compared them 
to two existing facilities. For comparison I used data regarding initial planning, costs and delays, 
common challenges and interviews of project managers. The result of analysis showed that 
managers do not reveal planning process openly and do not discuss details in public. Therefore 
in order to answer to my research questions I can use assumptions and name the possible reasons 
for cost overruns and delays. From the analysis of available data I can conclude that probably 
managers used econometric calculations in order to plan and forecast. As for the question how 
did they plan I can say that probably planning was made based on the previous experience of the 
companies operating these projects. They did not mention the method and approach they used. 
Some of them just mentioned about anonymous voting for the “Kimberley option” (Woodside). 
While the others mentioned that they decided to ask some of the project participants to 
participate in decision making process (Chevron Australia). Was it possible to avoid these 
issues? Most probably not: even if companies will use previous experience of their own and 
similar projects in Australia the critical success factors change over time within industry, market, 
organization and global competition. All of these factors influence planning, decision making 
and implementation stages of the projects. 
Conclusions derived from analysis of theoretical concepts and empirical findings: 
 Identifying challenges and critical success factors does not guarantee exact results, 
because they change over time. 
 It is not possible to know exact cost of a project due to the uncertainty of environment 
and some factors are beyond of control: currency appreciation, competition, and labor 
costs. 
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 What is referred as “mistakes” in one project should be considered as challenge for 
another. LNG projects have different critical success factors than Olympic projects for 
example. Thus, benchmarking and comparing numbers with successful NWSV project 
and relying on previous experience of companies does not guarantee that they will be on-
time and on-budget.  Even experienced managers cannot know all threats and 
opportunities. They and their effect change over time. 
 Scenario planning principles help to define hidden patterns and reasons and gives 
opportunity to see different options and alternatives. Moreover it can motivate 
participants to discuss issues more openly and benefit from cooperation. 
 Knowing motives and key drivers of decision making process helps to make project 
participants to cooperate and work in more transparent environment. 
 Human factor influences decision making process but external environment can influence 
people taking decision, thus competition is also stressing managers when they take 
decision. Though it is important to consider human factor we cannot explain behavior 
only through motivational theory. 
 What is true for today can be seen differently after few years: thus predictions made in 
2008 might not be correct in terms of 2013. So, it might look as a result of “human bias”, 
“massaging the plan” and ignorance of past experience. But in reality effect of various 
factors change over time. For example managers knew about labor deficit and high 
wages, as well as currency appreciation. But they cannot measure and estimate how 
strongly they will influence schedules and costs. Woodside used labor transfer from 
NWSV to Pluto project but concentration of projects in Australia made existing 
challenges worse. Companies compete for labor, thus deficit is not being reduced and 
wages are rising more.  
 As for currency appreciation: it is becoming stronger as a result of rise in terms of trade, 
commodity prices for exports (oil, coal, iron, etc.) high interest rates on investments 
(Garton, et al., 2012). This looks like paradox: “Australian paradox”: the country is 
getting cash flows from abroad, but this is making internal challenges more difficult to 
overcome. We do not know yet how much effect LNG investments will have on currency 
appreciation. The projects under construction have start dates varying from 2014 o 2020. 
 At the same time Asian investors spending more capital in LNG projects as their costs 
rises. After completion of projects they will expect the price for LNG to be high to justify 
their investments (Bradshaw, et al., 2013). The “Asian consumer paradox”:  they wanted 
to secure supply and future prices so started to invest in projects, but at the end it is them 
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who will be expecting high prices. It seems that Australian LNG projects were meant to 
be costly and future LNG prices are meant to be high as well. 
 Expectations do not necessarily coincide with reality. Scenario planning principles might 
help to create alternative realities and choose the one which will coincide with people’s 
and project’s expectations the most.  
 
6.2 Contribution 
 
I believe that this paper can be useful for the project planning process in different companies 
involved in Australian LNG projects as well as their rivals in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, 
I think that the Royal Dutch Shell scenario planning method should not be underestimated as 
being “not scientific enough” (Wright, 2004), and should be correctly understood. It gives 
opportunity to see “possible realities” (Kahane, 2012) and measure how much our expectations 
coincide with it. Future is uncertain and like any other managerial tool RDS scenario planning 
principles can help to better plan and minimize negative effect of uncertainty, since no method 
can measure all uncertainties.  
 
This work is proving that future is uncertain and scenario planning principles are helpful to be 
prepared for it. Applying RDS principles does not reject any “scientific” or econometric 
approach. On a contrary it shows how combination of approaches can make process of planning 
and implementation more flexible. 
 
 
6.3 Limitations of research 
 
The data for my thesis was taken from available public sources. Unfortunately I cannot make 
strong conclusions regarding what really went wrong in Australian LNG projects. The reason for 
that is firstly, I was not involved in planning process and I have no access to all documents used 
for final investment decision. Moreover, I was studying oil and gas companies and even access 
to the company representatives for interview was not granted. But through my mails with some 
of the projects and companies I have realized that the information during personal interview will 
not be too different from the one available on official sources. This made me assume that lack of 
direct interviews is not a big issue for studying my research questions and describing the 
problem from different perspectives. What I have tried to do is to answer to the question how 
88 
 
better plan for uncertain future. Final investment decisions in the companies are usually taken on 
the basis of the econometric calculations which are despite of being “scientific” and more precise 
and objective (Wright, 2004) are also subject to change and can be “massaged” and adjusted to 
influence decision (Pinto, 2013). That is why I started to make sort of benchmarking myself by 
learning from managers of other projects why projects usually are facing problems of delays and 
over costs. Empirical findings of this paper were checked through the prism of “seven deadly 
sins”, “human factor” and “csf” mainly. This helped me to identify possible reasons for issues. I 
underline that conclusions regarding Australian projects made by me are based on possible 
reasons based on findings of Pinto (2013), Kahane (2012), Parker Gates (2010), and Wong 
(2007). Learning from KPMG (2011)and RDS experiences helped on the other side to see why it 
can be better to use these principles.  
 
6.4 Research opportunities for the further disposition of the thesis 
 
Shell is involved in many Australian LNG projects, the question is about whether scenario 
planning approach was considered as possible management tool for future planning. Research 
showed why it is useful to apply RDS principles when future is uncertain. But it brought out 
questions that can be studied further. Which factors influence the choice regarding managerial 
tools and approaches? This paper shows that all managerial approaches are actually influenced 
by human factor.  
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